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NOTES
WHEN IS FICTION JUST FICTION?

APPLYING HEIGHTENED THRESHOLD TESTS TO
DEFAMATION IN FICTION
Mark Arnot*
Whenever a work offiction can be reasonably readas stating actualfacts
about a real person, courts allow juries to decide whether the work actually
conveys a defamatory meaning. As a result, current defamation law
essentially forces fiction authors to write about unidentifiable people or
unbelievable events. This Note examines the jurisprudence surrounding
defamation in fiction and,for comparison, defamation by implication. After
surveying policy arguments, the Note concludes that current defamation
law is inconsistent, inefficient, and burdensome as applied to fiction.
Finally, the Note suggests that courts apply a heightened threshold test to
defamation in fiction claims, similar to the tests courts sometimes apply to
defamation by implication claims or use to assess falsity or actual malice.
The adoption of an appropriate heightened threshold test would retain
protection for reputations while allowing authors to avoid liability through
the use of contextual devices, such as disclaimers, and without altering the
content of their work.
INTRODUCTION

In 2006, New Republic columnist Michael Crowley authored a critical
profile of author Michael Crichton.' Shortly thereafter, Crowley noticed a
strong resemblance between himself and the character "Mick Crowley" in
Crichton's latest novel, Next. 2 In addition to having nearly identical names,
both Crowleys are graduates of Yale University and political journalists in
Washington, D.C. 3 In the novel, Mick Crowley's appearance is brief but

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2003, Northwestern
University. I am grateful to my family and friends for their love, support, and good humor.
1. See generally Michael Crowley, JurassicPresident, New Republic, Mar. 20 & 27,
2006, at 16.
2. See Michael Crowley, Cock and Bull, New Republic, Dec. 25, 2006, at 34, 34
(referencing Michael Crichton, Next 225 (2006)).
3. See id.
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notable. He is a pedophile on trial for sodomizing a two-year-old child and,
4
Crichton writes, his "penis was small."
Crichton has apparently resorted to employing the small penis rule, a "sly
trick" used in publishing to ward off defamation lawsuits. 5 Assuming no
man would come forward claiming to be a character with a small penis (or
would invite such an inquiry), the scheming author simply depicts his target
as less than fully endowed. 6 The author then defames as he pleases and
hopes his subject forgoes legal action due to the possible embarrassment of
coming forward. 7 Thus, the small penis rule is not really a rule, merely a
tactic for discouraging litigation. 8 In the end, Michael Crowley appears
disinclined to file suit. Although "grossed out," Crowley 9says that he was
"strangely flattered" by his "sliver of literary immortality."
The small penis rule illustrates the awkwardness of applying defamation
law to works of fiction. Defamation law hardly furthers its purpose of
protecting reputations by incentivizing the use of such tricks. Despite its
inefficiency, however, the law manages to impose a heavy burden on
writers who, unlike Crichton, do not wish to use fiction as a vehicle to
defame. Unfortunately, under the vague standards of current defamation
law, fiction writers cannot depend on contextual devices, such as
disclaimers, to shield them from liability. As a result, they must alter the
content of their work, likely dulling its impact and diminishing its artistic
value. Reputations are indeed worthy of some protection. The suggestions
proposed below, however, recognize the importance of creating clearer
standards and of allowing authors and publishers to immunize their works
without changing the content itself.
Generally, defamation law makes no special distinctions for works of
fiction. As long as a publication can be reasonably read as stating a false
and defamatory fact about the plaintiff, it is actionable.' 0 The only other
significant legal hurdle for a plaintiff is establishing the defendant's
requisite level of fault, which varies depending on whether the plaintiff is a

4. Id. (quoting Crichton, supra note 2, at 225).
5. See id. (referencing Dinitia Smith, Writers as Plunderers: Why Do They Keep
Giving Away Other People'sSecrets?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1998, at B9).

6. Id.
7. Of course, a plaintiff could claim that the small penis allegation is itself false and
defamatory. There are, however, potential problems with such a claim: (1) describing one's
anatomy as "small" may not be sufficiently factual, see infra Part I.B.2; (2) the claim would
likely trigger additional scrutiny of the plaintiffs anatomy to determine the statement's truth
or falsity, see infra note 332; and (3) if the statement does not accurately describe the
plaintiff, then the defendant may use this to argue, albeit weakly, that the statement is not
about the plaintiff, see infra Part I.B. 1.
8. See Crowley, supra note 2; see also Smith, supra note 5 (quoting a libel lawyer as
explaining, "Now no male is going to come forward and say, 'That character with a very
small penis, 'That's me!"').

9. Crowley, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 439-40, 442 (10th Cir. 1982).
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public or private individual. Public officials and public figures must prove
actual malice, while private figures must show only some level of fault. 1'
Repeatedly, courts have found that works labeled as fiction can be
12
reasonably read as stating false and defamatory facts about plaintiffs.
Thus, current defamation law essentially forces fiction authors to write
about unidentifiable people or unbelievable events. 13
As a result,
commentators often note that the law affords fiction inadequate and
14
inconsistent protection.
This Note suggests that courts apply a heightened threshold test to claims
of defamation in fiction, similar to the tests some courts have adopted for
claims of defamation by implication. Traditionally, a defendant is liable for
any statement his communication reasonably implies. 15 The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, however, fashioned a
heightened threshold test requiring that "[t]he language . . . not only be
reasonably read to impart the false innuendo, but . . . also affirmatively
suggest that the author intends or endorses the inference."' 16 Adapted for
fiction, this standard would require that the publication not only be
reasonably read to convey a false statement of fact about the plaintiff, but
also affirmatively suggest that the author intends or endorses the factual
meaning. Furthermore, the realistic style or content of a fictional work
should be insufficient to provide this affirmative suggestion. Rather, the
suggestion should relate to how the work is presented, for example, whether
there is a prominent disclaimer stating that the work is fictional. This
standard would allow fiction writers to fully express themselves, as long as
they clearly indicate that their work is fictional.
This standard is reinforced by consideration of the supportable
interpretation rule. This rule protects commentary, such as book reviews,
by finding that the commentary is true, provided it is a "supportable
interpretation of the source material."' 7 Although the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated this rule in cases concerning actual malice, the D.C. Circuit
incorporated it into the falsity element. 18 Incorporating the doctrine into the

11. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-49 (1974).
12. See, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (Ct. App. 1979); Bryson v.
News Am. Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1218-21 (Ill. 1996); Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill
Co., 126 N.E. 260, 262 (N.Y. 1920).
13. See, e.g., Glenn J. Blumstein, Nine Charactersin Search of an Author: The Supreme
Court'sApproach to "Falsity" in Defamation and Its Implicationsfor Fiction, 3 UCLA Ent.
L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1995).
14. See, e.g., id.; infra Part II.B.1-2.
15. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
16. Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing White v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
17. Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 313, 315-17 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("[W]hen a

reviewer offers commentary that is tied to the work being reviewed, and that is a supportable
interpretation of the author's work, that interpretation does not present a verifiable issue of
fact that can be actionable in defamation.").
18. Id. at 316; see infra note 411.
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falsity element recognized that the only evidence of the author's intent is
usually the publication itself.
The supportable interpretation rule is not easily adapted for fiction
because works of fiction generally do not directly critique specific source
material. A rough equivalent, however, might protect any work supporting
an interpretation that it does not state actual facts about real people. After
all, it would be odd to protect literature reviews without extending similar
protection to the literature itself. A better approach may be to incorporate
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's actual malice standard
into the falsity element. This would require, in light of the total
"presentation of the article," evidence that the defendant "intended to
19
suggest" the false, i.e., literal, meaning.
In addition, courts should redefine "negligence" in assessing whether a
defendant has taken reasonable measures to ensure that readers do not
interpret a work of fiction as stating actual facts. Where the defendant has
20
not acted negligently, the constitutional fault requirement is not met.
Negligence should not be presumed simply because a defendant has failed
to ensure that every possible factual interpretation is unreasonable. Again,
instead of looking to the content itself, courts should focus the
reasonableness inquiry on how the work is presented, in particular, the
clarity and prominence of any disclaimers. Similarly, regardless of a
defendant's state of mind, a finding of actual malice should be precluded
where the publication (including disclaimers) indicates that the defendant
21
did not intend a literal, defamatory reading.
Part I of this Note presents background information and introduces key
issues. In particular, Part L.A briefly describes the traditional common law
of defamation and provides an overview of the applicable constitutional
framework. Part I.B outlines how courts address the two biggest issues in
most defamation in fiction claims: (1) whether the work is "of and
concerning" the plaintiff, and (2) whether the work conveys a statement of
fact about the plaintiff. Part I.C examines the various ways courts analyze
defamation by implication claims. Part I.D briefly addresses the application
of the fault requirement.
Part II discusses arguments advanced by
commentators for and against the application of a heightened threshold test
to defamation in fiction claims. Part III suggests that courts assessing such
claims would benefit by adopting a heightened threshold test focusing on
the intent of the author as conveyed by the publication itself. Finally, this
Note recommends that courts provide a clear definition of what reasonable
measures a defendant can take to preclude fault, and hence liability.

19. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001).
20. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-49 (1974).
21. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1187 (adopting this standard).
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I. THE LAW OF DEFAMATION: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The primary purpose of defamation law is to allow people to protect their
reputations "from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt. ' 22 As Justice
Potter Stewart stated, this interest "reflects no more than our basic concept
of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the
'23
root of any decent system of ordered liberty."
In general, claims of defamation in fiction and defamation by implication
are treated no differently than other defamation claims. 24 The same basic
elements and constitutional doctrines apply. 25
In essence, the
communication at issue must be reasonably capable of stating,
explicitly or
26
implicitly, a false fact that harms the plaintiffs reputation.
When a statement is only implied or presented as fiction, however, there
is a heightened risk that the author did not intend the meaning that the
plaintiff claims it conveys. Thus, in such situations, courts must determine
whether a defendant may be held liable for a reasonable, but perhaps
27
unintended, meaning conveyed by his statement.
Due to the nature of defamation in fiction, two inquiries are particularly
significant: (1) whether the publication is "of and concerning" the plaintiff,
and (2) whether the publication contains a statement of fact about the
plaintiff.28 The "of and concerning" inquiry is complex because works of
fiction usually do not explicitly reference the plaintiff, but instead present a
slightly fictionalized version. 29 Similarly, the statement of fact inquiry is
complicated because, unlike most statements,
works of fiction purport not
30
to represent actual persons or events.
In adjudicating claims of defamation by implication, courts analyze not
only the defendant's literal statement, but also assess what the statement

22. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-93 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
23. Id.
24. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) ("The test is
not whether the story is or is not characterized as 'fiction,' 'humor,' or anything else ... .
25. See id.
26. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977) (listing traditional elements of
defamation cause of action).
27. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("Application of this general standard becomes even more difficult where the reported facts
are materially true and the alleged defamation is not stated explicitly. If the speaker or
author has not uttered the alleged defamation explicitly, how is the court to discern whether
it would be reasonable to understand the alleged defamatory meaning to have been
intended?"); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1989)
("[I]f a speaker knowingly publishes a literally untrue statement without holding the
statement out as true, he may still lack subjective knowledge or recklessness as to the
falsification of a statement of fact required by New York Times.").
28. See Pring,695 F.2d at 439.
29. See, e.g., Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 925-27 (7th Cir.
2003); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 43-44 (Ct. App. 1979) (Files, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Pring,695 F.2d at 442-43.
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reasonably implies. 3 1 Because an implication is unstated and thus naturally
ambiguous, determining its meaning is often troublesome. 32 For example,
courts are often forced to determine whether a statement of opinion implies
33
an underlying factual assertion that is false and defamatory.
Finally, the application of the fault requirement to both implication and
fiction claims is somewhat complicated. Where actual malice is required,
courts generally require that the defendant was aware not only of the
statement's falsity, but also of the defamatory meaning attributed to it.34
Negligence is often defined as simply neglecting to negate a reasonable
35
defamatory meaning.
A.

Common Law and ConstitutionalFramework

Traditionally, a statement was considered defamatory if it was
communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, was false, and tended to
harm the plaintiffs reputation in the community. 36 The defamatory nature
of a statement, however, may also refer separately to its tendency to harm
37
one's reputation.
Under the common law, "the fact that [a publication] did not assume to
state a fact or an opinion [was] irrelevant. '3 8 In Burton v. Crowell
Publishing, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a photograph capturing the plaintiff in an awkward and seemingly
ridiculous pose was capable of a defamatory meaning. 39
Furthermore, because the common law generally presumed falsity, it was
not necessary for a statement to be factual (i.e., provable as true or false) in
order to satisfy the falsity requirement.4 0 Truth was only "an affirmative
31. See 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems §
2.4.5, at 2-33 & n.107 (3d ed. 2007); see also infra note 167 (explaining the difference
between innuendo and implication).
32. See C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State
of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 237, 237-38
(1993).
33. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1990).
34. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)
("To show actual malice, Hoffman must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
[the defendants] intended to create the false impression in the minds of its readers ....

It is

not enough to show that [the defendant] unknowingly misled readers into thinking Hoffman
had actually posed for the altered photograph."). But see Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr.
29, 35-36 (Ct. App. 1979) (disregarding a novel's fictional label and finding actual malice
by reasoning that because the author witnessed events described in the novel, there could "be
no suggestion that she did not know the true facts").
35. See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
36. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980);
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558-89 (1977).
37. See Sack, supra note 31, § 2.4.1, at 2-14 ("Definitions of 'defamatory' are often
stated directly in terms of the tendency to injure reputation.").
38. Burton v. Crowell Publ'g Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936).
39. Id.
40. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. b (explaining that under the "common
law... majority position... the falsity of a defamatory communication is presumed"). The
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defense which must be raised by the defendant and on which he ha[d] the
burden of proof. '4 1 Judge Learned Hand explained the logic of this in
Burton: "The only reason why the law makes truth a defense is not because
a libel must be false, but because the utterance of truth is in all
circumstances an interest paramount to reputation .... 42
Under the traditional common law, fault was not an element of a
defamation claim. 4 3 Thus, a defendant could be held strictly liable for harm
done to another's reputation as a result of publishing a defamatory
statement. 44 The common law's presumption of falsity and lack of any
fault requirement made authors of nonfactual statements particularly
vulnerable to defamation claims. Because one cannot prove that a
nonfactual statement is true, defendants authoring works of fiction, opinion,
45
parody, or visual art could not readily capitalize on the defense of truth.
Common law doctrines such as fair comment (and, later, neutral reporting)
may continue to provide some protection, but only in limited
46
circumstances.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court recognized that
defamation's common law form required constitutional safeguards to
ensure that free speech had adequate "breathing space." 4 7
While
recognizing the states' strong interest in protecting reputations, the Court
also noted that defamation "must be measured by standards that satisfy the
First Amendment. '48 In addition, the Court recognized the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be

competing view holds that there was no need to presume falsity because it was actually not
an element. See id. § 581A reporter's note ("In view of the present uncertainty of whether
truth is a defense for the defendant or falsity is a requirement of plaintiffs case, the Section
is now neutral ....
" (citations omitted)); 1 Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on the Law of
Slander and Libel 204-05 (Albany, C. Van Benthuysen & Co. 1843) (explaining that the
truth of a statement is a legal justification because it would be contrary to public policy to
allow a defendant to recover for that "which he had justly forfeited by his misconduct");
John Townshend, A Treatise on the Wrongs Called Slander and Libel § 73 (4th ed., New
York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1890) ("If the language is true, it is a defense; but it does not
thence follow that falsity is an essential element of the wrong." (footnote omitted)).
41. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. b.
42. Burton, 82 F.2d at 156.
43. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990); Wash. Post
Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F.2d 207, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
44. See Kennedy, 3 F.2d at 208.
45. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13-14.
46. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, The Law of Defamation, Privacy, Publicity, and
Moral Right: Cases and Materials on Protection of Personality Interests 82-83, 217 (4th ed.
2000) (citing Jeffrey E. Thomas, Comment, Statements of Fact, Statements of Opinion, and
the First Amendment, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1001, 1002 (1986)); Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J.
Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 825, 854-55 (1984); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13-14 ("[D]ue to concerns that
unduly burdensome defamation laws could stifle valuable public debate, the privilege of 'fair
comment' was incorporated into the common law as an affirmative defense to an action for
defamation.").
47. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
48. Id. at 269.
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uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 49 According to the Court, however,
the defense of truth was not enough to guarantee such wide-open debate:
[T]he defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant,
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred .... Under such a

rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is
in fact true, because of doubt whether
it can be proved in court or fear of
50
the expense of having to do so.
To ensure greater breathing space, the Court articulated a constitutional
fault element "prohibit[ing] a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 5 1 In
addition, the Court required that actual malice be shown with "convincing
52
clarity."
Addressing the "of and concerning" requirement, the Court also held that
"an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations" could not be
3
transmuted into the "libel of an official responsible for those operations. '5
Thus, "[s]ince ...there was no other evidence to connect the [New York

Times] statements with [Sullivan], the evidence was constitutionally
insufficient to support a finding that the statements referred to
respondent.'"54
In a number of opinions following Sullivan, the Supreme Court expanded
and clarified First Amendment limitations on defamation claims. In Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court held that although a private-figure plaintiff
is not required to prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, he must
prove some level of fault. "[T]he States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for ...defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual," the Court stated, "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault."' 55

49. Id. at 270.
50. Id. at 279 (citations omitted). "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment
guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth-whether
administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials-and especially one that puts the
burden of proving truth on the speaker." Id. at 271.
51. Id. at 279-80.
52. Id. at 285-86.
53. Id. at 292.
54. Id.
55. In Gertz, the U.S. Supreme Court also announced that plaintiffs must prove actual
malice before they may recover presumed or punitive damages. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) ("[W]e hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed
or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth."). The requirements outlined in Gertz, however, do not
necessarily apply unless the speech at issue involves a matter of public concern. See 1
Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation §§ 2:12, 3:7-:8 (2d ed. 2007); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (plurality opinion)
("In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public
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The next year, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court
concluded that, in addition to a showing of fault, the First Amendment
requires that, "at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public
concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also
56
showing that the statements at issue are false."
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Court reexamined dicta in Gertz
that lower courts had interpreted as creating a constitutional protection for
opinion. 57 The Court dispelled the notion that the dicta in Gertz "was
intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that
might be labeled 'opinion.' 5 8 Such an exemption, the Court explained,
"would... ignore the fact that expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an
assertion of objective fact."'59 The Court provided an illustration:
If a speaker says, "In my opinion John Jones is a liar," he implies a
knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an
untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his
assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false
assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion
does not dispel these implications; and the statement, "In my opinion
Jones is a liar," can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement,
"Jones is a liar." As Judge Friendly aptly stated: "It would be destructive
of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of
conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words
[defamatory
60
'I think."'
In recognizing that statements of opinion may imply underlying facts, the
Court also rejected the use of factors to separate fact from opinion.
Although lower court decisions, such as Ollman v. Evans, had relied on
such factors, 6 1 Milkovich dismissed them as creating "an artificial
dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact."' 6 2 Instead, the Court insisted that
63
free speech was "adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine."

concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive

damages--even absent a showing of 'actual malice."'). Also, although Gertz and other
Supreme Court opinions seem to differentiate between media and nonmedia defendants, this
distinction is likely, though not positively, irrelevant. See Smolla, supra, §§ 3:9-: 10.
56. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986).
57. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); see also Oilman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("In Gertz, the Supreme Court in dicta seemed to
provide absolute immunity from defamation actions for all opinions and to discern the basis
for this immunity in the First Amendment.").
58. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18 ("The 'marketplace of ideas' origin of this passage 'points
strongly to the view that the 'opinions' held to be constitutionally protected were the sort of
thing that could be corrected by discussion."' (quoting Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639
F.2d 54, 62 n.10 (2d Cir. 1980))).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 18-19 (alteration in original) (quoting Cianci,639 F.2d at 64).
Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
Id.
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B. Defamation in Fiction
1. The "Of and Concerning" Requirement

Every defamation plaintiff must demonstrate that the publication at issue
is "of and concerning" him-in other words, that it refers to, or is about,
him. 64 As explained by the Second Circuit, the plaintiff must prove that the

statement "'designates [him] in such a way as to let those who knew him
understand that he was the person meant.'

' 65

Notably, courts do not mean

"meant in the mind of the writer," but instead "meant by the words

employed. '66 Courts generally allow the issue to reach a jury as long as the
average or reasonable reader could conclude that the publication is "of and
concerning" the plaintiff.6 7 The jury then decides whether the publication
68
actually refers to the plaintiff.
Without discussion, courts actually articulate the inquiry in two different

ways. They alternate between determining whether the work is meant to
refer to the plaintiff and whether the work is understood as referring to the
plaintiff.69 Although these standards seem similar, the difference is that one
version completely disregards intent, while the other attempts to deduce
intent from the publication. In most cases, the distinction will likely be
meaningless, because reasonable people naturally read a publication as
intending to mean what they understand it to mean. The distinction could

be dispositive, however, where more than one meaning is apparent, a
meaning is implied but not stated, or the meaning depends on extrinsic
70
facts.
Labeling a publication as fiction does not preclude a finding that it is "of
and concerning" the plaintiff, provided a reasonable reader could interpret

64. See, e.g., Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966) ("In
order for a libelous statement to be actionable, the plaintiff must show that it was published
'of and concerning' him." (quoting Julian v. Am. Bus. Consultants, Inc., 137 N.E.2d 1, 11
(N.Y. 1956))).
65. Id. (quoting Miller v. Maxwell, 16 Wend. 9, 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836)); see also
Hulton v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (applying the same
standard); accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564 cmt. d (1977).
66. Hulton, [1910] A.C. at 26. But see Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 278-79 (D.
Minn. 1947) (concluding that, according to Minnesota case law, a defamation claimant must
show that "the author of the defamatory article intended to write of and concerning the
plaintiff").
67. Anyanwu v. CBS, 887 F. Supp. 690, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Kelly v.
Schmidberger, 806 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1986); Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., No.
04 Civ. 2128, 2005 WL 991772, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2005); Matthew Savare,
Comment, Falsity, Fault, and Fiction: A New Standardfor Defamation in Fiction, 12
UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 129, 140 (2004).
68. Anyanwu, 887 F. Supp. at 692.
69. Compare Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1069
(8th Cir. 1992) (examining a false light claim), with Geisler v. Pertocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639
(2d Cir. 1980).
70. See, e.g., White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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the work as referring to the plaintiff.7 1 The "of and concerning"
requirement is generally the same whether the publication at issue is fiction
or nonfiction. However, perhaps due to the ambiguity and subjectivity of
the test, courts sometimes rephrase or elaborate upon it when addressing
works of fiction. In Geisler v. Petrovelli, for example, the Second Circuit
stated that "the reasonable reader must rationally suspect that the
protagonist is in fact the plaintiff, notwithstanding the author's and
publisher's assurances that the work is fictional. '72 The court also stated
that the similarity between the plaintiff and the fictional character must be
"something more than amusing coincidence or even conscious parallelism
on a superficial plane." 73 In addition, in Wheeler v. Dell, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for 74the Seventh Circuit noted that "suggestion is not
identification."
Some courts, particularly state and federal courts in New York, appear to
go even further and apply a heightened standard to works of fiction, often
without recognizing or discussing their departure from the reasonableness
standard. 75 For example, in Springer v. Viking Press, after citing the
reasonable person standard, 76 a New York appellate court articulated a
significantly more demanding standard. According to this heightened
standard, "the description of the fictional character must be so closely akin
to the real person claiming to be defamed that a reader of the book,
77
knowing the real person, would have no difficulty linking the two."
Furthermore, "[s]uperficial similarities are insufficient[,] as is a common
first name." 78 Interestingly, a more recent decision by a New York
appellate court adopted Springer's heightened standard without even
79
referring to the reasonable person standard.
In determining whether a publication is "of and concerning" the plaintiff,
courts often follow the same principles of interpretation that they employ
when assessing whether a work is capable of an implication 80 or a
defamatory meaning. 81 In a sense, determining whether a statement is
about the plaintiff and determining what a statement says about the plaintiff
71. Geisler, 616 F.2d at 639.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Wheeler v. Dell Publ'g Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962).
75. See, e.g., Carter-Clark v. Random House, Inc., 793 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (App. Div.
2005); Springer v. Viking Press, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249 (App. Div. 1982); see also Sack,
supra note 31, § 2.9.6 & n.547 (reciting standards).
76. Springer,457 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
77. Id. at 249.
78. Id.; see also Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891, 892-93 (Ct.
App. 1985) ("[A]s a matter of law, mere similarity or even identity of names is insufficient
to establish a work of fiction is of and concerning a real person.").
79. See Carter-Clark,793 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
80. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2005).
81. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting that
sometimes courts treat the requirement that the publication be understood as describing
actual facts about the plaintiff as part of the "of and concerning" requirement).
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are really two aspects of deciding its overall meaning. 82 To determine
meaning, courts engage in a fact-sensitive analysis of "the totality of the
circumstances and the context in which the speech was given." 83 To guide
this analysis, some courts look to specific factors, such as the medium of
communication, 84 "'the general tenor of the entire work, the subject of the
statements, the setting, and the format of the work.' ' 85 Nonetheless, the
"the publication as a whole
overriding consideration remains the same:
86
and... its effect upon the average reader."
Consistent with this emphasis on the average reader, courts give words
their "natural and obvious meaning." 87 Accordingly, where "statements are
clear and unambiguous," they "cannot be enlarged upon or changed from
the sense in which they were used."'8 8 Some decisions, however, emphasize
that "'the publication is to be measured... by the natural and probable
effect upon the mind of the average reader."' 89 The precise differences
between these standards are unclear.
Although perhaps a handful of jurisdictions, most notably Illinois, use an
innocent construction rule, 90 the rule's applicability to fiction appears to be
weak. Under Illinois's innocent construction rule, "[e]ven if a statement
falls into a recognized category, it will not be actionable per se if [the judge
decides that] the statement 'may reasonably be innocently interpreted or
reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the
plaintiff."' 9 1 Although the story at issue in Bryson v. News America
82. See id.; Springer, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (introducing discussion of the "of and
concerning" element by noting that it is "for the court to decide whether a publication is
capable of the meaning ascribed to it" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. Bollea v. World Championship Wrestling, Inc., 610 S.E.2d 92, 97 (Ga. Ct. App.

2005).
84. See Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 2006).
85. Knievel, 393 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Underwager v. Channel 9 Austl., 69 F.3d 361,
366 (9th Cir. 1995)) (discussing whether referring to a celebrity as a "pimp" in a
photograph's caption could reasonably be read literally).
86. Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1308, 1324 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
87. Bryson v. News Am. Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Ill. 1996).
88. Julian v. Am. Bus. Consultants, Inc., 137 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 1956).
89. Kaelin v. Globe Commc'ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Bates v. Campbell, 2 P.2d 383, 385 (Cal. 1931)) (stressing that California courts apply the
"natural and probable" standard); see also Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Libel by
Newspaper Headlines, 95 A.L.R.3d 660 (1979) (collecting cases).
90. See, e.g., Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1216-19; see also Sack, supra note 31, § 2.4.14 &
n.258.1 (noting that Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, and Ohio might recognize similar
innocent construction rules).
91. Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Chapski v. Copley Press, 442 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Il1. 1982)); see also Bryson, 672
N.E.2d at 1214-15 ("If a defamatory statement is actionable per se, the plaintiff need not
plead or prove actual damage to her reputation to recover. Rather, statements that fall within
[the] actionable per se categories are thought to be so obviously and materially harmful to
the plaintiff that injury to her reputation may be presumed. If a defamatory statement does
not fall within one of the limited categories of statements that are actionable per se, the
plaintiff must plead and prove that she sustained actual damage of a pecuniary nature
[The categories] are: (1) words that impute the
('special damages') to recover ....
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Publications, Inc. was labeled "fiction," a character shared the plaintiffs
last name. 92 Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
"claim that the story must be innocently construed as referring to someone
other than the plaintiff. '9 3 By not entertaining the possibility that the story
was merely referring to a fictional "Bryson," the court implicitly indicated
that the innocent construction rule does not apply to fictional works, at least
where the plaintiffs last name is used.
The defendant in Muzikowski v. ParamountPictures Corp. similarly tried
to rely on the innocent construction rule. Paramount argued that it was
"reasonable to construe the statements in question as referring to someone
other than Muzikowski (namely O'Neill, an entirely fictional character). '94
Interpreting Illinois law, the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding
that, "[i]n light of Bryson, the mere fact that Paramount labeled its movie
'fictitious' is not enough to shield it from an Illinois defamation action." 95
The Seventh Circuit went further than Bryson, however, and indicated that
Illinois's innocent construction rule required the plaintiff to show "that no
one could [reasonably] think that anyone but him was meant."' 96 The court
then stated that this requirement had been met because changes to the
character, "far from supporting an innocent construction that O'Neill is a
'9 7
fictional or different person, only serve to defame him."
Despite general principles of interpretation, application of the "of and
concerning" test is notoriously inconsistent. 9 8 One commentator observed
that, "[a]lthough courts are essentially attempting to answer the same
inquiry, they do not always ask the same questions and frequently differ as
to the significance of various factors." 99
When assessing whether a reader could reasonably conclude that a work
is "of and concerning" the plaintiff, courts compare and contrast the
plaintiff with his fictional counterpart.1 00 In doing so, they look to almost
every identifiable trait-including name, physical appearance, age,
geographic location, occupation, events, experiences, relationships, and

commission of a criminal offense; (2) words that impute infection with a loathsome
communicable disease; (3) words that impute an inability to perform or want of integrity in

the discharge of duties of office or employment; or (4) words that prejudice a party, or
impute lack of ability, in his or her trade, profession or business." (citations omitted)); Sack,
supra note 31, §§ 2.8.1, 2.8.3, 2.8.6 (explaining the complicated usage of the term "per se").
92. Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1218-19.
93. Id.
94. Muzikowski, 322 F.3d at 925.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 927.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Savare, supra note 67, at 141, 155-56.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Smith v. Huntington Publ'g Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Ohio
1975); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564 cmt. d (1977).
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personality. 10 1 In addition, courts often give significant weight to whether
the publication appears to be fictional. 10 2 They also consider the overall
context,10 3 including the general appearance and labeling of the publication,
whether it was marketed as fiction, the presence (or absence) of a
04
disclaimer, and the content itself.1
The significance of a disclaimer stating that a work, or a name within a
work, is fictitious varies from one case to another. In Smith v. Huntington,
for example, the court's decision turned explicitly on the presence of a
disclaimer informing readers that the names in a newspaper article were
fictitious: "[A]s a matter of law, no reasonable person could have
reasonably believed that the article pointed to the plaintiff in the light of a
clear statement by the author in boldface print that the names were
fictitious."' 1 5 On the other hand, sometimes courts afford disclaimers
comparatively less weight. In Stanton v. Metro Corp., for example, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed a district court ruling
that had dismissed a defamation claim based on the presence of a
disclaimer. 10 6 The First Circuit concluded that, "given the placement of the
disclaimer in the article and the nature of the publication in general, a
10 7
reasonable reader could fail to notice it.'

In addition to disclaimers, courts often give significant weight to the
nature of the content itself. Many courts dismissing claims simply hold that
the work in question is clearly or obviously fictional. 10 8 Thus, when the
content is clearly fictional, a disclaimer may not be necessary, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is identifiable.1 09 On the other hand, a disclaimer may
be ineffective when the content seems factual.10

101. See Smolla, supra note 55, § 4:47 & nn.1-11 (collecting cases); Debra T. Landis,
Annotation, Libel and Slander: Sufficiency of Identification ofAllegedly Defamed Party, 54
A.L.R.4th 746 (1987) (same).
102. Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969); see also
Films of Distinction, Inc. v. Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (dismissing claims where the movie as a whole was "clearly a work of fiction");
Lyons v. New Am. Library, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (App. Div. 1980) ("[T]he
statements which form the basis of the complaint cannot be read to refer to plaintiff. The
work clearly states that it is fiction and that, combined with plaintiff's admission that he did
not participate in the Son of Sam investigation, requires the conclusion that the passage is
not actionable.").
103. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (8th
Cir. 1992).
104. See, e.g., Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 125-30 (1st Cir. 2006); Carter-Clark
v. Random House, Inc., 793 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (App. Div. 2005).
105. Huntington Publ'gCo., 410 F. Supp. at 1273-74.
106. Stanton, 357 F. Supp. 2d 369, 381-83 (D. Mass. 2005), rev'd, 438 F.3d 119.
107. Stanton, 438 F.3d at 128.
108. See Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969); see also
supra note 102.
109. See, e.g., Middlebrooks, 413 F.2d at 143; New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks 146 S.W.3d
144, 160-61 (Tex. 2004).
110. See Bryson v. News Am. Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1219 (I11. 1996).

2007]

DEFAMA TION IN FICTION

1867

One case, for example, illustrates that even strong similarities between a
plaintiff and a fictional character may not establish identity when the work
is clearly fictional. In Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co., the Fourth
Circuit affirmed a summary judgment ruling in favor of the defendant,
despite the author's use of a slight variation of the plaintiffs name
(substituting "Esco Brooks" for "Esco Middlebrooks")."'1
The court
reasoned that the article "was an obvious work of fiction":
*It was listed in the fiction section of the Post index, was labeled fiction, and
was illustrated by cartoons. The context in which the name appears is
important because [n]ames of characters portrayed in * * * short stories * * *

and other obvious works of fiction are normally understood by all
reasonable men as not intended to depict or refer to any actual person * * *
Of course the fictional setting does not insure immunity when a
reasonable man would understand that the fictional character was a
portrayal of the plaintiff... But the marked dissimilarities between the
fictional character and the plaintiff tend to support the District Court's
finding against the reasonableness of an identification of the two....
Fox's use of actual place names and geographical settings does not
militate against the common understanding of fiction as fiction only.
Authors of necessity must rely on their own background and experiences
in writing fiction. 112
In other cases, a work's realistic style and subject matter have led courts
to the opposite conclusion. 113 For example, in Bryson, mentioned above,
the main character in a magazine article was alleged to be a depiction of the
plaintiff, despite the fact that the article was labeled "fiction."' 14 The
character, who shared the plaintiffs last name, was described in the article
as a "slut. '1 15 Among other similarities, the article took place in the
1
southern Illinois county where both the plaintiff and the author lived. 16
The Illinois Supreme Court held that, "although the story Bryson is labeled
as fiction, the story itself is not so fanciful or ridiculous that no reasonable
person would interpret it as describing actual persons or events." 117 The
court noted that the story portrayed "realistic characters responding in a
realistic manner to realistic events" and concluded that a "reasonable reader

111. Middlebrooks, 413 F.2d at 142-43.
112. Id. at 143 (last two omissions added) (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 212
(Ct. App. 1997) ("The difficulty with [the plaintiffs] argument is that this film is manifestly

not about [the plaintiff]. It is about a fictional character .... ").
113. See, e.g., Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 111 S.W.3d 168,
171, 174 (Tex. App. 2003) ("While Paramount intended to use a fictional company name
and did depict a 'scam' as opposed to an actual sweepstakes contest, these facts do not make

the segment an 'obvious work of fiction.' Paramount considered Hard Copy to be a news
show. Hard Copy identified the segment as an 'undercover' report about a 'nationwide
scam.').
114. Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1213-14, 1219.
115. Id. at 1212, 1213.

116. Id. at 1212.
117. Id. at 1221.
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could logically conclude that the author of the story had drawn upon her
own experiences as a teenager when writing the story."'1 18 In addition, the
court reasoned that "[t]he name 'Bryson' is not so common that we must
find, as a matter of law, that no reasonable person would believe that the
article was about the plaintiff."' 19
Courts also give varying weight to the fact that the reasonable person
applying the "of and concerning" standard is someone who knew or knew
of the plaintiff. 120 In Jones v. Hulton, a British case from the turn of the
century, plaintiff Artemus Jones complained of an article in the defendant's
newspaper that professed to report on an Englishman's adulterous exploits
in France. 12 1 The paper claimed that it had been unaware of the plaintiff's
existence and intended to use a purely fictitious name.' 22 In a decision
affirmed by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal held that, despite
notable differences between the plaintiff and the fictional Jones,
identification was possible because some readers may have only limited
knowledge of the plaintiff:
No doubt any person who knew the plaintiff intimately, and read the
whole of the article carefully, would come to the conclusion that it did not
refer to him ....But this again was for the jury, and it might well be that
the article would be read by persons who knew the plaintiff by the name
of Artemus Jones and by repute and from his public life and position, and
did not know in what123part of London he resided or whether he was or was
not a churchwarden.
In Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., on the other hand, the court used a
more knowledgeable reasonable person, and specifically assumed that he or
she would know about the plaintiff s personality. 124 The plaintiff in
Wheeler complained about Anatomy of a Murder, a novel (also adapted into
a movie) that was based on an actual murder trial. 125 Although the court
recognized that nearly every fictional character in the novel represented a
real counterpart, it nonetheless held that "none who knew Hazel Wheeler
[the plaintiff] could reasonably identify her with Janice Quill [the fictional
character]."' 26 Despite numerous similarities, the court concluded that
"those who knew [the plaintiff] was Chenoweth's widow and mother of
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1218.
120. Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Davis v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951) ("The issue [is] whether
persons who knew or knew of the plaintiff could reasonably have understood the exhibited
picture to refer to him." (emphasis omitted)).
121. Jones v. E. Hulton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444, 445 (C.A.), affid, [1910] A.C. 20
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). The article reports, in part, "'Whist! there is
Artemus Jones with a woman who is not his wife, who must be, you know-the other
thing! .' Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See Hulton, [1910] A.C. at 20.
Hulton, 2 K.B. at 455.
Wheeler v. Dell Publ'g Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 375.
Id. at 375-76.
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Terry Ann could not reasonably identify her with Janice Quill, for Hazel
Wheeler denies having any of the 'unsavory characteristics' of Janice
Quill."'1 27 Thus, the court held that the allegedly defamatory traits were the
same traits that precluded identification. 128 Notably, other courts have
reached the opposite conclusion in similar circumstances. 129
In a case arising out of a book about the singer Madonna, the First Circuit
recently demonstrated similarly acute attention to the reasonable person's
knowledge of the plaintiff. 130 The book contained a photograph of a gay
man that was incorrectly captioned with the plaintiff's name., 3 1 Although
the plaintiff claimed this was tantamount to being called a homosexual, the
court dismissed the claim, finding that "[flew, if any," readers would be
able to recognize the man in the photograph as a gay man, but not know his
name or what he looks like. 132 Similarly, in Polydoros v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., a California court found that a reasonable person
would not have enough knowledge to connect the forty-year-old plaintiff to
a ten-year-old fictional character in a film: "At most, the fictional character
physically resembles [the plaintiff] in the 1960's, a fact which would be lost
to anyone who was not acquainted with [him] when he was 10 years
old."' 33 Thus, the court held that "[n]o sensible person could assume or
believe from seeing 'The Sandlot' that it purports to depict the life of [the
134
plaintiff]."'
Although an author's intent is often relevant to proving whether a
defamatory statement was made with sufficient fault, it is generally not
relevant to determining whether a publication is "of and concerning" the
plaintiff. 135 Instead, the identification inquiry focuses on the publication's
effect on readers: "'The question is not so much who was aimed at as who
36
was hit.""1
In Jones v. Hulton, mentioned above, the defendant claimed that it had
"no intention whatsoever" of referring to the plaintiff, despite the fact that
127. Id. at 376. But cf Smith v. Huntington Publ'g Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D.
Ohio 1975).
128. Wheeler, 300 F.2d at 376. Noting that "suggestion is not identification," the
Wheeler court instead found that "any reasonable person. .. would more likely conclude that
the author created the latter in an ugly way so that none would identify her with Hazel
Wheeler." Id.
129. See, e.g., Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir.
2003) (finding sufficient evidence for the plaintiff to prove that differences between him and
a character in a film "only served to defame" the plaintiff, and did not suggest that character
was a fictional or different person).
130. Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2005). Although this case
does not involve a work of fiction, its discussion of the "of and concerning" element is
wholly applicable.
131. Id. at 71.
132. Id. at 73.
133. Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 212 (Ct. App.
1997).
134. Id.

135. Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966).
136. Id. (quoting Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 126 N.E. 260, 262 (N.Y. 1920)).
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Jones had "contributed signed articles to the defendants' newspaper.' '1 37
Although the plaintiff accepted that the article had intended to refer only to
"the imaginary Artemus Jones," 13 8 the court found that this was irrelevant
and upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The author's intention,
one of the lords explained, "is inferred from what39he did [i.e., published].
His remedy is to abstain from defamatory words."'
Courts similarly ignore intent where the reference to the plaintiff seems
clearly malicious. In Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., the plaintiffs claim
involved a novel that "somewhat realistically" depicted adventures in New
York's underworld. 140 In the novel, the character Justice Cornigan (also
referred to as Corigan) presides over cases in the Jefferson Market Court.
Joseph E. Corrigan, the plaintiff, had a strikingly similar name and had
presided over cases in the same court. 14 1 The New York Court of Appeals
concluded that the author of the novel had purposefully defamed the
plaintiff due to an unpleasant experience he had when appearing before the
plaintiff as a criminal defendant. 142 Nonetheless, the court emphasized that
intent is not relevant to determining whether a work is "of and concerning"
the plaintiff:
The [publisher] is chargeable with the publication of the libelous matter if
it was spoken "of and concerning" him, even though it was unaware of his
existence, or that it was written "of and concerning" any existing
person....
"If the publication was libelous, the defendant took the risk. As was
said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whatever a man publishes, he
publishes at his peril."'

137. Jones v. E. Hulton & Co., [1909] 2 K.B. 444, 445 (C.A.), aff'd, [1910] A.C. 20
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
138. Hulton, [1910] A.C. at 21-22.
139. Id. at 24. The court also found no error in the trial court's jury instructions, which
stated, "If you think any reasonable person would think [that the article referred to a mere
imaginary person], it is not actionable at all. If, on the other hand, . . . those who did know
of the existence of the plaintiff would think that it was the plaintiff-then the action is
maintainable .. " Id.
140. Corrigan, 126 N.E. at 262.
141. Id. In its decision, the court noted the egregiousness of the defendant's demeaning
depiction:
The inference from the unsavory details as related to the facts is unmistakably that
the author Howard intended by this chapter deliberately and with personal malice
to vilify plaintiff, under the barely fictitious name of Cornigan, in his official
capacity, and to expose him to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy as being
ignorant, brutal, hypocritical, corrupt, shunned by his fellows, bestial of
countenance, unjust, dominated by political influences in making decisions, and
grossly unfit for his place. A paragraph in another chapter, entitled "The Gay
Life," of like import, portrays the man Comigan even more offensively as an
associate of low and depraved characters. No attempt was made by defendant to
establish the truth of these allegations ....
Id.
142. Id. at 264.
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The fact that the publisher has no actual intention to defame a
particular man or indeed to injure any one does not prevent recovery of
compensatory damages by one who connects himself with the
publication .... 143

However, despite pronouncements by courts and commentators that
144
intent is irrelevant to whether a work is "of and concerning" the plaintiff,1 4 5
courts have on some occasions expressly considered the author's intent.
In Clare v. Farrell,for instance, the main character of the defendant's novel
had the same first and last names as the plaintiff.1 46 None of the events in
the book, however, "even remotely tend[ed] to identify [the plaintiff] as the
person about whom the author was writing."' 147 In reviewing Minnesota
case law, the court concluded that the cases "seem to test the right of
recovery, first, on whether the author of the defamatory article intended to
write of and concerning the plaintiff, and second, whether it was so
understood by those who read the article or by those who knew of its
contents." 148 As there was "no doubt that... [the] defendant did not intend
the
to write the book of plaintiff or intend to appropriate plaintiffs name to 49
story," the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.'
2. Statement of Fact Requirement
To sustain a defamation claim, a publication must not only refer to the
plaintiff, but must also "reasonably be understood as describing actual facts
about the plaintiff or her actual conduct." 150 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the statement of fact requirement is mandated by the
First Amendment. 15 1 According to the Court, this requirement "provides
143. Id. at 262 (quoting Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
144. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 31, § 2.9.6 ("Intent of the author is generally irrelevant to
whether or not a communication is 'of and concerning' an individual.").
145. See, e.g., Landau v. CBS, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254, 257-58 (Sup. Ct. 1954) ("To make
such accidental or coincidental use of a name a libel would impose a prohibitive burden
upon authors, publishers and those who distribute the fruits of creative fancy, in whatever
The line of demarcation is not obscure. The difference between
form presented ....
coincidental use and consciously disguised defamation is one of proof." (citations omitted));
Allen v. Gordon, 446 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (App. Div. 1982) (holding that despite the fact that
plaintiff was "the only psychiatrist surnamed Allen in Manhattan," "Dr. Allen" was common
enough that it could not reasonably refer to the plaintiff, where the author had never been
treated by the plaintiff-dentist and had randomly selected the character's name).
146. Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 276-77 (D. Minn. 1947).
147. Id. at 278.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982) (interpreting and
applying Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass 'n of Letter Carriersv. Austin, 418 U.S.
264 (1974), and Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
151. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1990) (holding that without
an express or implied statement of fact the plaintiff cannot prove falsity or fault); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (holding that the First Amendment precludes an
emotional distress claim for an ad parody that "could not reasonably have been interpreted as
stating actual facts about the public figure involved"). The only potential exception to the
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protection for statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating
actual facts' about an individual."' 15 2 In addition, it "ensures that a
statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional
53
protection."1
As with the "of and concerning" and defamatory meaning elements,
courts generally defer to the jury unless the communication could not
154
reasonably be understood as stating actual facts about the plaintiff.
Although some courts describe the issue as a "matter of law," they similarly
55
defer to the jury as long as more than one interpretation is reasonable.1
In Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., the court noted that some
decisions treat the requirement of a false statement of fact "as part of the 'of
and concerning' requirement."' 56 However, it "is really part of the basic
ingredient of any defamation action; that is, a false representation of
fact."' 157 Pring was one of the first cases (if not the first) to apply the
statement of fact requirement to a work of fiction. Many defamation in
fiction decisions have subsequently
cited Pring for this proposition, making
8
it the de facto standard.15
The plaintiff in Pring complained of an article appearing in Penthouse
magazine. 159 Among other things, the article describes Charlene, who is
constitutional requirement that the plaintiff prove falsity is where a private-figure plaintiff
sues regarding a statement of private concern. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986) ("[A]t least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern,
a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at
issue are false.").
152. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065,
1068-69 (8th Cir. 1992).
155. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1415 (C.D. Cal.
1987) ("It is for the court to decide this issue in the first instance as a matter of law."), affd,
867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 207, 212 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Whether a published statement is actionable fact or
nonactionable opinion is to be decided by the court as a matter of law.").
156. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1308, 1324
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Pring);Mitchell v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 1235, 1239
(W.D. Ark. 1991) (citing Pring); Bollea v. World Championship Wrestling, Inc., 610 S.E.2d
92, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Pring); Bryson v. News Am. Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d
1207, 1220 (Ill. 1996) (applying Pring's standard of "could be reasonably understood as
describing actual facts about the plaintiff' but citing an Illinois case for support); Feche v.
Viacom Int'l Inc., 649 N.Y.S.2d 782, 782 (App. Div. 1996) (citing Pring and holding that
the "average viewer would not [think the broadcast] was making a factual statement"); New
Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 156 (Tex. 2004) (citing Pring); see also Unelko
Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990) (analyzing claim arising from
television news editorial and concluding that "the threshold question in defamation suits is
not whether a statement 'might be labeled "opinion,"' but rather whether a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the statement 'impl[ies] an assertion of objective fact'
(alteration in original) (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990))).
159. Pring,695 F.2d at 439.
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Miss Wyoming and has the unique ability to perform oral sex such that the
recipient suddenly levitates off the ground. 160 The article ends with
Charlene at the pageant, in front of a live audience and television cameras,
16
performing the act on her coach and causing him to levitate in the air. 1
Since the article "described something physically impossible in an
impossible setting," the court concluded that it was clearly pure fiction:
[I]t is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not have
understood that the charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing else.
It is impossible to believe that anyone could understand that levitation
could be accomplished by oral sex before a national television audience or
anywhere else....
...[A]s was said in Greenbelt, "even the most careless reader must
have perceived
that." The descriptions were "no more than rhetorical
162
hyperbole."
As with other types of defamation claims, a plaintiff bringing a
defamation in fiction claim bears the burden of proving falsity. 163 Once the
"of and concerning" requirement has been satisfied, proving falsity is
usually straightforward (after all, to the extent a work of fiction is taken
literally, it essentially admits to being false). 164 Any difference between the
plaintiff and his fictional counterpart is considered "false.' 165 Minor
inaccuracies, however "do not amount to falsity so long as the substance,
16 6
the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified."'
C. Defamation by Implication

As Judge Robert D. Sack stated in his defamation treatise, a "publisher is,
in general, liable for the implications of what he or she has said or written,
not merely the specific, literal statements made."' 167 The constitutional

160. Id. at440-41.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 443 (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970)).
163. See, e.g., id. at 440 (requiring a "false representation of fact"); Savare, supra note
67, at 135-36.
164. Savare, supra note 67, at 136-40.
165. Id.
166. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
167. Sack, supra note 31, § 2.4.5, at 2-33 & n.107 (footnotes omitted). Defamation law
distinguishes between implication, insinuation, and innuendo. Implication and insinuation
refer to the inference or "understanding that the average reader may ... draw from the face
of the communication." Innuendo, on the other hand, "refers specifically to the defamatory
meaning a reader may be expected to draw from the communication because of extraneous
facts known to the reader but not contained in the communication." Id. § 2.4.5, at 2-38.
Occasionally, however, courts use "innuendo" in its natural, general sense, referring to any
implication or insinuation. Id. § 2.4.5, at 2-39; see also Ladany v. William Morrow & Co.,
Inc., 465 F. Supp. 870, 875 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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requirement that a communication convey a statement of fact in order to be
actionable applies equally to fiction and implication claims. 168
As with fiction claims, courts assessing implication claims predominantly
use a reasonableness standard. 169 Under this standard, courts focus on
whether a reasonable person could conclude that the defendant's statement
implied the factual meaning alleged by the plaintiff. 170 If so, the issue goes
to the jury to determine what a reasonable person would actually
conclude. 171 Judge Sack noted, however, that an unrestrained approach that
allows juries to "draw whatever inferences [they] wished," could swallow
from liability, such as
other defamation principles that insulate statements
172
malice.
actual
and
truth,
substantial
opinion,
Recognizing the danger, many federal and state courts have adopted a
variety of approaches that attempt to distinguish between inferences for
which the author is liable and those for which he is not, even though both
might be reasonable. For example, in White v. FraternalOrder of Police,
the D.C. Circuit articulated a heightened threshold test that augments-or
arguably clarifies-the traditional reasonableness test. 173 Oregon's high
court has similarly concluded that "the link between the communication and
the defamatory inference must not be too tenuous." 174 Other states, such as
Montana and Ohio, have categorically rejected all claims "based on
innuendo or inference."' 175 In Louisiana, "a defamatory implication [is
actionable only] if the statements regard a private individual and private
affairs."' 176 Even then, the private individual would need to prove that the
implication is "'ascertainable by a reasonable person with some degree of
that it is the "principal inference
certainty," ' 177 and must perhaps also show
17 8
a reasonable reader or viewer will draw."'
Similar doctrines of interpretation apply to both fiction and implication
claims. In general, courts give words their natural meanings and look to the
168. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990).
169. See, e.g., id. at 21.
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., id.; Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 124-25 (1st Cir. 2006).
172. Sack, supra note 31, § 2.4.5, at 2-34 & nn.109-13.
173. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990); infra
note 203 and accompanying text.
174. Brown v. Gatti, 145 P.3d 130, 133 (Or. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The practical meaning of this is somewhat ambiguous, however, since the court then
explained, "[W]hen a claim for defamation requires the drawing of a defamatory inference,
the inference that the plaintiff seeks to draw from the facially nondefamatory communication
must be reasonable." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. McConkey v. Flathead Elec. Coop., 125 P.3d 1121, 1130 (Mont. 2005); see also
Krems v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland, 726 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) ("Ohio
does not recognize libel through implied statements."). The Montana court, however, went
on to state that, "if the stated opinion does not disclose the facts upon which it is based, and
as a result creates the reasonable inference that it is based on defamatory facts, there is no
protection for the statement." McConkey, 125 P.3d at 1131.
176. Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So. 2d 706, 717 (La. 1999) (emphasis omitted).

177. Id. (quoting Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So. 2d 378, 382-83 (La. 1988)).
178. Id. at 717 n.8.
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"over-all context" 79 or totality of the circumstances. 180
Thus, the
implication must be present in the "plain and natural meaning" of the words
used.' 8 ' In addition to these guidelines, some courts use specific factors or
prongs to guide their analysis. 182 Similar to New York's factors, the Ninth
Circuit uses a three-pronged test to guide its examination of the "totality of
the circumstances":
"First, we look at the statement in its broad context, which includes the
general tenor of the entire work, the subject of the statements, the setting,
and the format of the work. Next we turn to the specific context and
content of the statements, analyzing the extent of figurative or hyperbolic
language used and the reasonable expectations of the audience in that
is
particular situation. Finally, we inquire whether the statement 1itself
83
sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false."
Regardless of the specific factors, however, the dispositive inquiry
remains the same: whether, in light of "'the over-all context in which the
assertions were made, . . . the reasonable reader would have believed that

the challenged statements were conveying facts about the libel
plaintiff."" 184 Courts also apply the following rule:
[T]he meaning of the alleged defamatory language cannot, by innuendo,
be extended beyond its ordinary and common acceptation. The province
of the innuendo is to show how the words used are defamatory, and how
they relate to the plaintiff, but it cannot introduce new matter, nor extend
the meaning of the words used, or make that certain which is in fact
85
uncertain. 1

As a statement of opinion is not literally a statement of fact, defamation
by implication claims often involve statements that purport to be
opinions. 186 In such cases, determination of whether the statement is
actionable depends upon whether the statement implies undisclosed, false
facts. 187

Hatfill v. New York Times Co. illustrates the application of the traditional
threshold test. 188 In Hatfill, the plaintiff complained of a series of editorials
by Nicolas Kristof appearing in The New York Times. 189 The editorials

179. See, e.g., Flamm v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2000).
180. 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 107 (2007) (noting various ways courts consider
context).
181. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 331 (4th Cir. 2005).
182. See, e.g., Flamm, 201 F.3d at 153 (noting the three factors considered by New York
courts).

183. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Underwager v.
Channel 9 Austl., 69 F.3d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1995)).
184. Flamm, 201 F.3d at 153 (quoting Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (N.Y.
1995)).
185. Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 331 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
187. See id.
188. Hatill,416 F.3d at 330-31,333.
189. Id. at 333-34.
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presented evidence linking the plaintiff to the anthrax mailings of 2001 and
urged officials to more rigorously investigate him, but they also cautioned
readers to presume his innocence. 190 Applying Virginia law, the Fourth
Circuit noted that a "defamatory charge may be made expressly or by
inference, implication or insinuation. In short, it matters not how artful or
disguised the modes in which the meaning is concealed if it is in fact
defamatory."' 91
The court concluded that, "[b]ased on [the articles'] assertions, a
reasonable reader of Kristof's columns likely would conclude that Hatfill
was responsible for the anthrax mailings in 2001 .192 Although the articles
did not make a direct accusation, the defendants thus could be liable for
imputing to the plaintiff the commission of a crime involving moral
193
turpitude because the stated facts "g[ave] rise to [this] inference."'
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting
94
the defendant's motion to dismiss. 1
Although applying slightly different reasoning, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit similarly concluded that "Minnesota law would allow
for implied defamation claims." The court stated that because the common
law requires a statement "to be construed in light of a document as a
whole," the artificial juxtaposition of two statements "can give rise to an
19 5
actionable implication."'
The plaintiff in White v. FraternalOrder of Police complained of letters
the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) sent to the local U.S. attorney's office.
The letters reported on irregularities in the drug testing of the plaintiff, who
was then a nominee for the rank of captain in the Washington, D.C.,
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). 196 The letters stated,
[I]t appears that drug testing procedures have been subverted to protect
one and possibly more MPD officials from the results of positive
urinalysis tests .... If records have been falsified, false statements made,
or testing procedures subverted for gain (such as promotion), it97 is likely
that criminal as well as ethical violations have been committed. 1
Robert C. White also complained of two related media stories. 198 Although
he conceded that "much" of the information in the letters and news reports
was true, he asserted that the "letters were defamatory by implication and
190. Id. at 333.
191. Id. at 331 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. at 333.
193. Id. at 335.
194. Id. at 334, 337.
195. Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 396 (8th
Cir. 1996) (surmising how Minnesota courts would rule on an implied defamation claim).
Notably, Toney was decided after Minnesota's high court had ruled in Diesen v. Hessburg,
455 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1990), that implications were not actionable with respect to publicfigure plaintiffs.
196. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 514-16 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
197. Id. at 515 (alteration in original).
198. Id. at 516.
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reports effected defamation by the omission of
that the respective news
199
certain crucial facts."
The court acknowledged that the usual standard was that "'[t]he meaning
of a communication is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but
reasonably, understands that it was intended to express."' 20 0 The court,
however, expressed the need for added guidance in cases "where the
reported facts are materially true and the alleged defamation is not stated
explicitly." 20 1 Specifically, the court asked, "If the speaker or author has
not uttered the alleged defamation explicitly, how is the court to discern
whether it would be reasonable20 2to understand the alleged defamatory
meaning to have been intended?"
After reviewing the case law, the court determined that prior decisions
had implicitly followed a common rule:
In sum, the court must first examine what defamatory inferences might
reasonably be drawn from a materially true communication, and then
evaluate whether the author or broadcaster has done something beyond
the mere reporting of true facts to suggest that the author or broadcaster
intends or endorses the inference. We emphasize that the tortious element
is provided by the affirmative conduct of the author or broadcaster,
although it is immaterial for purposes of finding defamatory meaning
whether the author 20or3 broadcaster actually intends or endorses the
defamatory inference.

Furthermore, the court explained that "it is the defamatory implication-not
the underlying assertions giving rise to the implication-which must be
the statements are entitled to full
examined to discern 'whether
20 4
constitutional protection."
The court found that the letters met this heightened standard because
"[b]y raising the specter of criminal violations,.., the FOP provided a clear
signal from which a reader could conclude, rightly or wrongly, that the
defamatory inference was intended or endorsed. '20 5 The articles were not
actionable, however, because they "merely reported true facts from which a
reader might infer that White used drugs." 20 6 There was "no evidence in
the text of the articles to suggest that it would be reasonable for a reader to
conclude that [The Washington Post Company] intended the defamatory
inference. Beyond unpleasant but true facts, the articles are devoid of any
199. Id. at 518-19.
200. Id. at 519 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 (1977)).
201. Id.

202. Id.
203. Id. at 520.
204. Id. at 523. Quoting a treatise, the court went on to state, "[I]f the defendant
juxtaposes [a] series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection between them, or
[otherwise] creates a defamatory implication . . . he may be held responsible for the
defamatory implication, unless it qualifies as an opinion, even though the particular facts are
correct." Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Id. at 521.
206. Id. at 526.
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suggestive juxtapositions, turns of phrase, or incendiary headlines. '207
Turning to the NBC broadcast, the court found that the reporter's "dramatic
intonation, standing alone or in combination with other factors, was not
'208
sufficiently distinctive to convey a clear implication to the viewers.
Therefore, the court concluded that "the broadcast [was] not capable of
20 9
conveying a defamatory meaning."
In Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., the Fourth Circuit echoed the
heightened standard articulated by the D.C. Circuit three years earlier in
White.2 10 Citing White, the court reasoned that
because the constitution provides a sanctuary for truth, a libel-byimplication plaintiff must make an especially rigorous showing where the
expressed facts are literally true. The language must not only be
reasonably read to impart the false innuendo, but it must also
2 11
affirmatively suggest that the author intends or endorses the inference.
Notably, in Hatfill, discussed above, the Fourth Circuit refused to dismiss
the plaintiffs claim regarding defamatory implications, even though the
articles did not affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed
the implications. 2 12 Because the court was reviewing a motion to dismiss
and had to accept the plaintiff's allegation that the expressed facts were also
false, the court held that Chapin was "inapposite." 2 13 On remand, the
district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
district court found that the plaintiff could not establish actual malice as to
the implication that he was the anthrax mailer, and that the specific facts in
2 14
the columns were not materially false.
Although sometimes courts state that the omission of a material fact can
create a defamatory implication, 2 15 other cases contend that omissions are
more properly considered within the context of falsity.2 16 Essentially,
courts rely on the omitted fact to determine whether the implication was

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092-93 (4th Cir. 1993).
Id. (citing White, 909 F.2d at 520) (footnote omitted).
Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 334 n.7 (2005); see also supra notes 188-

94 and accompanying text.
213. Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 334 n.7.
214. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 488 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 2007).
215. See, e.g., Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978) ("In

our opinion, the defendant's reliance on the truth of the facts stated in the article in question
is misplaced. The proper question is whether the [m]eaning reasonably conveyed by the
published words is defamatory, whether the libel as published would have a different effect
on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
216. See Sack, supra note 31, § 2.4.5, at 2-35 ("Several other courts have concluded that,
at least where there is a public-figure or public-official plaintiff, there cannot be libel by
implication unless there is a specific fact omitted from the statement in question and that
omission renders the statement false.").
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false-not to determine what the statement implied. 2 17 The author's
knowledge of the omitted fact may be relevant to fault but, because the fact
was omitted, it should not affect the reasonable meaning of the
21
statement. 8
D. The Fault Requirement
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan described actual malice as requiring that
a defendant published a statement "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 2 19 Subsequent opinions
have explained that reckless disregard is a subjective standard and requires
clear and convincing evidence "that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication" 2 20 or "actually had a high degree of
'22 1
awareness of ...[its] probable falsity."

Suits involving defamation in fiction or by implication complicate the
fault issue because the defendant may not have intended or been aware of
the defamatory meaning alleged by the plaintiff.222

Recognizing the

subjective awareness required by actual malice, courts have
overwhelmingly adopted an expanded actual malice requirement that
requires awareness of the allegedly defamatory meaning. 223 In a passage
lower courts have apparently overlooked, the Supreme Court appears
specifically to require such a test. Milkovich stated that actual malice
requires awareness of the false implications-not merely awareness of the
falsity of those implications:
(W]here a statement of "opinion" on a matter of public concern
reasonably implies false and defamatory facts regarding public figures or
officials, those individuals must show that such statements were made
with knowledge of their false implications or with reckless disregard of
their truth. Similarly, where such a statement involves a private figure on
a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must show that the false
224
connotations were made with some level of fault as required by Gertz.

217. See Nichols, 569 S.W.2d at 420.
218. See Sack, supra note 31, § 3.8 ("There is substantial danger ... in permitting a fact
finder to base a finding of liability on something not explicitly contained in an allegedly
defamatory statement.").
219. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
220. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
221. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
222. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1194-95 (9th Cir.
1989).
223. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001);

Sack, supra note 31, § 5.5.1.2 & nn.380-84 (collecting cases); Thomas B. Kelley & Steven
D. Zansberg, Libel by Implication, Comm. Law., Spring 2002, at 3, 11 ("There is an
emerging consensus, primarily in the federal courts, that in implication cases a plaintiff must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knew of the defamatory
implication conveyed by the publication, or deliberately omitted facts that it knew would
negate the defamation.").
224. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990).
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Based on the subjective awareness that actual malice requires, Dworkin v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. similarly noted that, "if a speaker knowingly
publishes a literally untrue statement without holding the statement out as
true, he may still lack subjective knowledge or recklessness as to the
'22 5
falsification of a statement of fact required by New York Times.
Building on this, in New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, the Texas Supreme Court
fashioned a modified fault standard in a case arising out of a satirical
newspaper article. 226 Acknowledging the similarity between fiction and
implication claims, the court only slightly modified its fault test for
implications, which required knowledge or strong suspicion "that the article
was misleading or presented a substantially false impression. '227 Thus, the
court held that actual malice exists where "the publisher either kn[e]w or
ha[d] reckless disregard for whether the article could reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts." 228 The New Times court noted that
"[a]pplying the actual malice standard to a satirical work may 'become[]
confused because the author is usually well aware of any "falsity" contained
in the comment and indeed intends no "truth." That sounds like "actual
malice.""',,

229

Hardly any decisions have adopted this "automatic actual malice"
standard. 2 30 However, in one such decision, Bindrim v. Mitchell, the court
reasoned that because the defendant-author attended therapy sessions
resembling those described1 in her book, she could not argue that "she did
23
not know the true facts."
Since "actual malice" concentrates solely on defendants' attitude toward
the truth or falsity of the material published and not on malicious motives,
certainly defendant Mitchell was in a position to know the truth or falsity
of her own material, and the jury was entitled to find that her publication
was in2 3reckless
disregard of that truth or with actual knowledge of
2
falsity.

The dissent pointed out that the majority's opinion essentially inferred
actual malice "from the fact that the book was 'false."' 233 Although "[t]hat
inference is permissible against a defendant who has purported to state the

225. Dworkin, 867 F.2d at 1194-95 (noting that, under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974), and St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, New York Times actual malice

requires "subjective awareness of probable falsity").
226. New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 163 (Tex. 2004).
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982); Bentley
v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 603 (Tex. 2002)).

229. Id. at 162 (quoting Sack, supra note 31, § 5.5.2.7.1, at 5-111).
230. Id. But see Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 35 (Ct. App. 1979); see also
Miss Am. Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (D.N.J. 1981)
(calling Bindrim "instructive" but distinguishing it on the facts).
231. Bindrim, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
232. Id. at 35-36 (citations and footnote omitted).
233. Id. at 44 (Files, J., dissenting).
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truth[,] ... when the publication purports
to be fiction, it is absurd to infer
234
malice because the fiction is false."
The expanded actual malice standard, as noted by Judge Sack, takes into
account this possible gap between the meaning the defendant intended and
the one the plaintiff alleges:
[W]hether the speaker means to say something true and it is understood to
mean something false, or to say something benign and it is understood to
mean something defamatory, innocent or negligent misstatement is fully
protected by the "actual malice" standard. It is for this reason that
implications perceived in a statement but not intended by23 the
speaker
5
cannot be actionable in public official or public figure cases.
Perhaps realizing that the logic of Bindrim could also eviscerate Gertz's
minimum fault requirement, 236 some courts have compounded a negligence
element into the "of and concerning" test.237 For example, in Stanton v.
Metro Corp., the court articulated this test: "'A plaintiff may establish that
the defendant's words were of and concerning the plaintiff by proving at
least that the defendant was negligent in publishing words which reasonably
could be interpreted to refer to the plaintiff.' 2 38 Interpreting Gertz, Judge
Sack expanded on this reasoning in his treatise:
If an author takes reasonable precautions to disguise the identity of a
character modeled or believed by readers to be modeled from real life,
assuming the fictional work can be said to be about a matter of legitimate
public concern, the author is not guilty
of "fault" and, as a matter of
2 39
constitutional law, should not be liable.
240
Courts, however, have not clearly defined "reasonable precautions."
Instead, courts essentially presume negligence whenever the defendant
publishes a defamatory statement. 24 1 For example, in Stanton the court
provided this rather circular definition:
[I]t may be inferred that the defamer was negligent in failing to realize
that the communication would be [understood as referring to the plaintiff],
provided the plaintiff can prove that a reasonable understanding on the

234. Id. at 44-45.
235. Sack, supra note 31, § 5.5.1.2, at 5-75 to -76.
236. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564 cmt. f(1977).
237. See Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 128 (1st Cir. 2006).
238. Id. (quoting Riley v. Associated Press, 797 N.E.2d 1204, 1215 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003)).
239. Sack, supra note 31, § 2.9.6, at 2-150. Note that this assumes "the Gertz
requirement of 'fault' extends to matters other than falsity." Id. § 2.9.6 n.549.
240. Cf Eric Scott Fulcher, Note, Rhetorical Hyperbole and the Reasonable Person
Standard: Drawing the Line Between Figurative Expression and Factual Defamation, 38
Ga. L. Rev. 717, 723 (2004) (concluding that because the Supreme Court "has given lower
courts little guidance on how the reasonable person standard should be applied.., courts
have addressed rhetorical hyperbole in a variety of ways").
241. See, e.g., Stanton, 438 F.3d at 131-32. One exception arises where the statement's
defamatory meaning is created by extrinsic facts unknown to the plaintiff. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 580B.
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part of the recipient that the communication referred to the
plaintiff was
242
one that the defamer was negligent in failing to anticipate.
Although unusual, at least a few courts have recognized that an author
may act reasonably despite referring to the plaintiff. In Clare v. Farrell,the
court held that, "even if... Minnesota law permits recovery if the writer
negligently wrote of and concerning the plaintiff in a defamatory manner,"
the defendant had not been negligent. 24 3 The court specifically noted that
the reasonableness standard should provide fiction authors with "some
latitude":
It would be an astonishing doctrine if every writer of fiction were
required to make a search among all the records available in this Nation
which might tabulate the names and activities of millions of people in
order to determine whether perchance one of the characters in the
contemplated book designated as a novel may have the same name and
occupation as a real person. At least some latitude must be given authors
in their selection of names for characters so that the production of
the base, and the good of
fictional literature may continue, and the mean,
244
the characters therein fearlessly portrayed.
Similarly, in Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the court
noted that "[t]he industry custom of obtaining 'clearance' establishes
nothing, other than the unfortunate reality that many filmmakers may deem
it wise to pay a small sum up front for a written consent to avoid later
having to spend a small fortune to defend unmeritorious lawsuits such as
As the court was addressing a "negligence" claim and
this one." 245
determined the work was not defamatory, however, this statement may not
246
fully apply to the Gertz fault standard.

II. APPLYING A HEIGHTENED THRESHOLD TEST TO
DEFAMATION N FICTION CLAIMS
As explained above, jurisdictions have developed a variety of tests to
address defamation by implication claims. 24 7 While some courts give such
claims no special treatment and simply apply the ordinary defamation
24 8
framework, others have developed heightened threshold tests.

242. Stanton, 438 F.3d at 131-32 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also New
England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 480 N.E.2d 1005,
1009 (Mass. 1985) ("While the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant 'aimed' at the
plaintiff, he or she must prove that the defendant was negligent in writing or saying words
which reasonably could be understood to 'hit' the plaintiff.").
243. Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 278 (D. Minn. 1947).
244. Id. at 279.
245. Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 212 (1997).
246. Id.
247. See supra Part I.C.
248. See supra Part I.C.
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Aside from a few exceptions, courts and commentators have thus far9
24
addressed defamation by implication apart from defamation in fiction.
However, considering the rise of heightened threshold tests for defamation
by implication-and the expansion of the supportable interpretation rule
into the falsity element-it seems appropriate to query whether disparate
treatment is justified. Drawing on the arguments of legal scholars and
commentators, this part discusses the appropriateness of adopting a
heightened threshold test to address comparable free speech concerns raised
by defamation in fiction claims.
A. Arguments Against Applying a Heightened Threshold Test to
Defamation in Fiction Claims

1. Appropriate Protection Already Exists
Many courts and commentators acknowledge that protection for works of
fiction is "bought only at a price."'2 50 As Frederick Schauer stated,
"[S]omeone who has become the recognizable centerpiece of an
unflattering portrayal has good reason to feel aggrieved.... Maybe [such
victims] should be denied recovery, but that is not the same thing as saying
'2 5 1
that they have not been harmed.
Commentators who support the current legal framework (or advocate
only slight adjustments) often argue that a statement likely has the same
ultimate effect upon the reader regardless of whether it purports to be
fiction or nonfiction. 252 Thus, according to Schauer, providing increased
protection for fiction would ignore the reality that fiction can damage
reputations just as easily as nonfiction:
[A] reader's picture of reality is quite likely to be influenced by works of
fiction, even if that reader knows full well that he or she is reading a work
of fiction. If my perception of small-town America is permanently
changed because of having read Main Street, Babbitt, and Dodsworth, and

if I still have trouble eating sausages because of having read The Jungle
some years ago, then it seems not at all surprising that someone's view of,
say, Dr. Bindrim would be changed as a result of having read Gwen
Mitchell's book, assuming that the identity between Bindrim and the
fictional character was known. Consequently, the effect of a false and

249. But see New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 162-63 (Tex. 2004)
(modifying the actual malice test used in defamation by implication cases and applying it in
a case arising from a fictionalized and satirical article).
250. Frederick Schauer, Liars, Novelists, and the Law of Defamation, 51 Brook. L. Rev.
233, 246 (1985). In Gertz, the Court acknowledged that it "has struggled... to define the
proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press
protected by the First Amendment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974).
251. Schauer, supra note 250, at 246.
252. See, e.g., id. at 262.
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unflattering portrayal 253
in a novel is likely to be exactly the same as that of
a work of nonfiction.
Thus, as the book in Bindrim was harmful to the plaintiffs reputation
despite its clear fiction label, Schauer did not find the result in that case
2 54
troubling.
Another commentator, Daniel Smirlock, has similarly argued that, "[i]f
readers can both acknowledge that a work is 'fictional' and still believe that
it refers to a real person, then the label attached to the work should be no
more dispositive than is the routine disclaimer." 255 Furthermore, although
"[a]uthors occasionally express their exasperation at readers' assumptions
that their novels are 'really' reportage or biography... the contradiction
'256
seems to be one that the law must live with.
Courts and commentators often worry that giving too much weight to
disclaimers would allow writers to immunize "thinly disguised character
assassination[s]. '' 257
In such a situation, "the disclaimer might be
understood by the reader as a mere wink, [not] indicating the absence ... of
factual truth. '258 Similarly, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Court
quoted Judge Henry Friendly's observation that "[it] would be destructive
of the law of libel if a writer could escape liability for accusations of
[defamatory conduct] simply by using, explicitly or implicitly, the words 'I
think. "259
In Schauer's view, authors are innocent only where their "characters bear
such a remote resemblance to anyone in real life that any defamatory
imputation would be absurd or [their] imputations are so [removed] from
reality as not even to suggest a hint of truth behind the fiction." 260 Writing
in 1985, Schauer noted that only a few cases imposed liability "upon the
totally innocent. '2 6 1 Thus, he concluded that defamation law struck an
appropriate balance between protecting fiction and reputation, and that only
253. Id. at 261-62 (footnotes omitted); see also Daniel Smirlock, Note, "Clear and
Convincing" Libel: Fiction and the Law of Defamation, 92 Yale L.J. 520, 532 (1983)

("[M]any readers seem nonetheless inclined to take fiction, or aspects of fiction, as the literal
truth.").
254. Schauer, supra note 250, at 260 ("[T]he dispute engendered by Bindrim concerns the
extent to which a person in Dr. Bindrim's position should have a cause of action when a
work clearly identified as fiction also clearly draws on that real person and makes
unflattering modifications in the character modeled after that person. As should be apparent
by now, I am not troubled by imposing liability under such circumstances."). Compare this
with Smirlock, supra note 253, at 525.
255. Smirlock, supra note 253, at 533.
256. Id. at 532-33.
257. Blumstein, supra note 13, at 31.
258. Id.
259. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (quoting Cianci v. New
Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
126 N.E. 260, 262-63 (N.Y. 1920) ("Reputations may not be traduced with impunity,

whether under the literary forms of a work of fiction, or in jest, or by inadvertence, or by the
use of words with a double meaning." (citations omitted)).
260. Schauer, supra note 250, at 243-44.
261. Id. at 243.
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slight modifications were warranted-namely, requiring that a plaintiff
prove the "of and concerning" element with clear and convincing
262
evidence.
Two years earlier, Daniel Smirlock took a similar position: "There is no
good reason why such motives, when they result in a novel genuinely
damaging to reputation, should receive any greater protection than they
would have received had they led to the production of a similar work of
nonfiction." 263 Like Schauer, however, Smirlock advocated making the "of
and concerning" requirement more rigorous. To do so, 264
he proposed three
elements: unmistakability, individuality, and conviction.
Another commentator, William E. Carlson, took aim at Pring v.
Penthouse International, Ltd.,26 5 which immunizes works that are too
outrageous to state actual facts. 266 Although Carlson agreed with the result,
he believed the holding was too broad and would "enable a mischievous
fictionist to escape liability for defamation by merely presenting impossible
feats in bizarre settings." 267 He noted that "the reasonable reader
nonetheless may cut through the superfluous verbiage and discover a
defamatory statement of fact. ' 268 Addressing the same concern, Smirlock
proposed limiting Pring by requiring courts to consider whether each
opposed to considering
specific element reasonably states actual facts, as 269
only the believability of the entire work as a whole.

Many critics of defamation law have focused their attention on the actual
malice test adopted in Bindrim. In addition to noting the weak basis for
establishing identification, they often claim that the decision provided
inadequate protection to works of fiction because it assumed knowledge of
falsity. 2 70 However, with the widespread adoption of the expanded actual
malice test, authors of fiction are arguably now adequately protected from
2 71

liability.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 258-59.
Smirlock, supra note 253, at 533.
See id. at 538-42.
695 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982).
William E. Carlson, Comment, Defamation by Fiction, 42 Md. L. Rev. 387, 423

(1983).

267. Id.
268. Id. at 426.
269. See Smirlock, supra note 253, at 541 & n.86; see also Schauer, supra note 250, at
261-62 (expressing a similar concern).
270. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the
American Law of Libel, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,46-47 (1983).
271. See supra notes 219-35 and accompanying text. Interestingly, commentators
writing on defamation in fiction have largely ignored the widespread adoption of the
expanded actual malice test. See, e.g., Savare, supra note 67, at 136-40. But see Sack, supra
note 31, § 5.5.1.2 & nn.380-84 ("There may be no substitute in fiction for actual people as
characters. A totally invented President or F.B.I. chief cannot convey to the reader the
complex of meanings and associations that the names Nixon or Hoover, complete with
mythological connotations, evoke. A rule that would ban or burden such communications on
the theory that they are known to be false would be at odds with the prized American
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
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According to Professors C. Thomas Dienes and Lee Levine, for example,
an expanded application of the actual malice standard (coupled with a
meaningful inquiry into whether the material bears a defamatory meaning)
would provide sufficient protection from liability for unanticipated but
reasonable interpretations of publications. 272 (Similarly, Dean Rodney A.
Smolla proposed that "[p]erhaps the best approach is to ask whether the
defendant at least acted with 'reckless disregard' for the likelihood that
some reasonable readers would fail to see that the material was parody. ' 273)
2. A Heightened Threshold Test Is Inappropriate for
Any Defamation Claim
Somewhat separate from the question of whether defamation law
sufficiently protects works of fiction from liability is the question of
whether heightened threshold tests are a good idea at all. Some courts and
commentators have resisted the use of special threshold inquiries even for
defamation by implication claims. For example, in Hatfill v. New York
Times Co. and Stanton v. Metro Corp., courts declined to depart from the
usual test of whether the publication reasonably implies the defamatory
274
meaning attributed to it.

Dienes and Levine agree with this approach and argue that declining to
apply a heightened test is consistent with the Supreme Court's defamation
jurisprudence. 2 75 They note that the Court has decided multiple cases
arising out of implied statements, but has never acknowledged a special rule
for them. 276 In Hatfill, the court adopted the standard in Milkovich, which
held that an implication is actionable as long as it can be reasonably
inferred from the defendant's statement. 27 7 Similarly, Judge Carlos Bea, in
dissent, recently criticized a decision by the Ninth Circuit for infringing on
the jury's role of determining the meaning of a statement: "'[The] court

institutions, which is, or at least is supposed to be, safeguarded by the First Amendment."

(footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)); supra notes 223, 229 and accompanying
text. Also, many of the relevant cases involve "fictionalization" or satire rather than
traditional fiction, and hardly any address fault with regard to the "of and concerning"
element. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001);
Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989); Bollea v. World
Championship Wrestling, Inc., 610 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); New Times, Inc. v.

Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. 2004).
272. See Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 244 (rejecting both blanket immunity for
implied libel as well as "the imposition of liability on a publisher simply because some
recipients of the communication could reasonably interpret the publication to have a
defamatory meaning").
273. Smolla, supra note 55, § 4:48, at 4-80.2.
274. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 331 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Stanton v.
Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 124-25 (1st Cir. 2006).
275. See Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 272.
276. See id. ("The plaintiffs in all of the Court's recent cases alleged libel by implication,
although none of its decisions purport to come to grips with the issue directly.").
277. See Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 333-34 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
18-19 (1990)).

2007]

DEFAMATION IN FICTION

1887

may not ...interfere with the jury's role by treating as nondefamatory a
statement that78 a reasonable juror may fairly read in context as
2
defamatory.'
In Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of Mind: The Promise
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Dienes and Levine argue that the
creation of special threshold tests for implied libel has "created a body'279
of
law that is inconsistent, often contradictory, and ultimately unhelpful.
Instead, the authors contend that the threshold inquiry should be limited to
the court's traditional, common law role of "determining whether the
publication at issue is reasonably capable of bearing a false and defamatory
280
meaning."
Interestingly, however, Dienes and Levine's conception of this general
test includes aspects of the heightened threshold test articulated in White v.
Fraternal Order of Police.2 81 They characterize White as "correctly
distinguish[ing] between what inferences 'can reasonably be drawn' from a
publication and the quite distinct inquiry concerning what meaning that
publication can reasonably be said to bear. ' 282 Furthermore, they note that
"the Post article did not accuse the plaintiff of... wrongdoing and could
not reasonably be read to mean that the Post was itself asserting that
allegedly false and obviously defamatory fact. '2 83 A publication's
"constitutional immunity," they conclude, should not be jeopardized "if its
only reasonable meaning is that the defendants284are raising questions to
which they do not purport to know the answers."
Ultimately, Dienes and Levine reject White only to the extent it
specifically requires "an overt purpose to convey the defamatory
meaning." 285 In their view, although an overt purpose is relevant, the
reporting of accurate facts can communicate a defamatory meaning even
without an affirmative endorsement of that meaning. 286 As an example,
they cite Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols. 287 Thus, they suggest that
courts should conscientiously employ the common law approach of
"view[ing] the article as a whole, including its form and context, to

278. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J., dissenting)
(omission in original) (quoting Sharon v. Time Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D.N.Y.
1983)).
279. Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 243; cf Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639
(2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the "seeming contradiction" of applying the "of and concerning"
test to fiction "is best resolved by the trier of fact since adjudication of the issue as a matter
of law will seldom satisfy the expectation that legal holdings be consistent and logical").
280. Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 243.
281. 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
282. Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 288.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 289.
285. Id. at 290.
286. Id. at 290-91.
287. 569 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tenn. 1978).
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determine whether it is reasonably capable of bearing a false, defamatory
288
meaning."
3. Fiction Is Diffe'ent from Implication
Even if heightened threshold standards are appropriate for assessing
implications, the justifications for providing this enhanced scrutiny are not
necessarily applicable to defamation in fiction. By definition, implied
meanings are not literally apparent. 289 Thus, because the "'danger to
reputation'

is not apparent from the face of the publication, . . . the

290
publisher [might be] unaware of any need to avoid such harm."
Commentators have explained that the "challenge" presented by "'implied
and the differing
libel' can be traced to the ambiguity of 29meaning
1
perceptions of readers, viewers, and listeners."
Also, courts sometimes root the threshold requirements for implied
292
defamation in an expanded application of the defense of substantial truth.
Thus, in White v. FraternalOrder of Police, the court phrased its holding as
applicable
to implications arising out of "the mere reporting of true
293
facts."
These underlying concerns are perhaps not applicable to defamation in
fiction. At least where a work is labeled as fiction, it arguably does not
literally state actual facts-because it explicitly says it is only fiction. In
this sense, fiction may only imply facts. Nonetheless, once fiction is
reasonably read literally, assessing the defamatory meaning is usually
straightforward.2 94 Once the "of and concerning" and statement of fact
requirements have been satisfied, any offensive distinction between the
plaintiff and the character is essentially defamatory-and these distinctions
29 5
are often readily apparent.
Also, as fiction does not purport to state any literal facts, the desire to
protect "the mere reporting of true facts" 296 is not applicable to defamation
in fiction claims. In fact, limiting liability for works of fiction would
arguably encourage the dissemination of false facts by barring defamation

288.
289.
290.
291.

Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 291.
See Sack, supra note 31, § 2.4.5, at 2-33, -38.
Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 223, at 3.
Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 237. Notably, in the context of visual art, the

predominant use of symbols and lack of words often leads to meanings so vague and
multilayered that they are not capable of being proven false and thus are effectively immune.
Laura Cohen, Beyond Silberman v. Georges: Shielding the Artist from Claims of Libel, 17

Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 235, 253 (1986) ("This expressive dexterity, however, leads to an
even greater likelihood of ambiguity in the visual realm than the linguistic, rendering a large
number of figurative art works 'unverifiable' within the meaning of Ollman." (citing Oilman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
292. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
293. Id.
294. See Smirlock, supra note 253, at 528-29.
295. Id.
296. White, 909 F.2d at 520.
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29 7
claims even where fiction is reasonably read as stating false facts.
Although fiction may present a "higher truth," Schauer has argued that it is
more useful to protect the flow of factual information, which is of greater
practical use. 298 Also, while authors can alter fiction to avoid defamatory
implications, objective facts are not as malleable.
Schauer has also suggested that "creative writers may be less sensitive"
than newspapers to potential defamation litigation.299 Thus, he reasons,
The problem seems to be more one of deterring publishers from accepting
novels for publication than of deterring novelists from writing them....
Insurance in the context of fiction seems especially attractive.., because
actions based on fiction are comparatively rare and because the costs
300

seem comparatively easy to spread out or pass on to book purchasers.

According to this line of reasoning, it seems, defamation liability is an
appropriate means of encouraging authors and publishers to utilize fiction's
malleability so as not to wrongly injure another's reputation.
B. Arguments in Favorof Applying a Heightened Threshold Test to
Defamation in Fiction Claims
1. Inconsistent and Unpredictable Standards Chill Speech
and Waste Resources
The Supreme Court has warned that clarity "in the area of free speech [is
particularly essential] for precisely the same reason that the actual malice
standard is itself necessary. Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional
protection can only dissuade protected speech-the more elusive the
Commentators, however,
standard, the less protection it affords." 30 '
regularly note that defamation law is woefully inconsistent and unclear in
its treatment of fiction. 30 2 In particular, commentators are critical of the "of
and concerning" test, noting that, although it is "imprecise30 4 and
inconsistent," 30 3 the Supreme Court "has done nothing to clarify [it]."
297. See Schauer, supra note 250, at 257-58, 261-62.

298. Id. at 255 ("For all its importance,... fiction is for most people a comparative
luxury. An incremental loss of some fiction seems, as a working hypothesis, less harmful
than the incremental loss of some political information. Society would suffer had we been
deprived of the novels of Edith Wharton, for instance, but not nearly as much as we would
suffer had we been deprived of the exposure of Watergate and its associated crimes.").
299. Id. at 244 n.56.

300. Id.
301. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989), quoted in
Blumstein, supra note 13, at 29.
302. See, e.g., Savare, supra note 67, at 141-53; Smirlock, supra note 253, at 524-25;

Heidi Stam, Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute First Amendment
Protection,29 Am. U. L. Rev. 571, 585 (1980).
303. Smirlock, supra note 253, at 526; see also Welch v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., No.
21756/90, 1991 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 225, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1991) ("Courts have
failed to carve out a clear standard as to how similar or how different the two must be.");
Savare, supra note 67, at 140 (explaining that "there is no clear test").

1890

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Commentators contend that lack of agreement as to "what is sufficient
evidence of identification" and "what constitutes actual malice or
negligence" 30 5 results in "a serious chilling effect on the publication of
realistic novels." 30 6 It makes publishers more "hesitant to publish fiction,"
and particularly hesitant to publish "historical novels and works by
unknown writers." 30 7 Of course, this chilling not only affects authors and
publishers; the public is "deprived of...30 work,
which may have important
8
entertainment, social, or political value."
Furthermore, commentators report that the uncertainty forces publishers
and distributors to spend extra time and resources subjecting creators of
fictional works to comprehensive clearance procedures, including
"elaborate inquisition[s]" as to their sources. 30 9 The looming possibility of
litigation also increases premiums for libel and errors and omission
insurance, pricing some content producers out of the market. 3 10 Notably, it
is the consumers who indirectly pay for these inefficient prophylactic
measures, as well as for litigation expenses and payouts. Although a clearer
standard would not eliminate the need to conduct clearances or procure
insurance, it would make these processes more efficient.
Of course, simply providing fiction with greater protection from liability
would also lower the cost of precautionary measures, especially insurance.
Every verdict in favor of a plaintiff potentially raises premiums, which may
price smaller companies out of the market. 3 11 For example, one judgment
3 12
of $9.2 million forced a small newspaper into bankruptcy proceedings.
Although the availability of insurance may enable some publishers to
spread risk and slightly blunt the chilling effect of defamation liability, it is
largely, arguably completely, irrelevant to deciding when a publication's
infliction of reputational harm should be compensable.

304. Smirlock, supra note 253, at 525.
305. Stam, supra note 302, at 585.
306. Id. at 582; see also Blumstein, supra note 13, at 29 (describing the test as "inevitably
chilling"); Smirlock, supra note 253, at 529 ("The shortcomings of the current 'of and

concerning' standard can lead to the same kind of 'chilling effect' on writers and publishers
that the Sullivan holding sought to prevent.").
307. Carlson, supra note 266, at 387.
308. Savare, supra note 67, at 156-57.
309. Id. at 157-58 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stam, supra note 302, at
586 nn.96-97 (describing publishers' clearance procedures in detail, as well as their
subsequent ineffectiveness).
310. Savare, supra note 67, at 158-59; see also Carlson, supra note 266, at 387 ("The
cost of libel insurance ... has skyrocketed .... ").

311. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Clash of a Judge and a Small Paper Underlines the
Tangled History of Defamation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 2006, at C4 ("Nonetheless, he added

of the verdict against The Chronicle: 'Could it affect premiums? Absolutely. That's a
matter of actuarial analysis. Could it make it difficult for small papers to afford insurance?
Possibly."').

312. Id.
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2. The "Reasonable Person" Test Is Too Vague
One commentator has argued that the inconsistency in the case law is not
the result of faulty application by the courts, but due to an "of and
concerning" test that is "badly in need of... elaboration." 3 13 According to
Smirlock, the test's "unelaborated reasonable-person standard" lacks "both
content and consistency when applied to works of fiction." 31 4 Notably, the
tests articulated in Pring and Milkovich also rely on the "unelaborated
standard," and are arguably in need of similar
reasonable-person
3 15
elaboration.
Although common law doctrines of interpretation provide some
supplementary guidance, inconsistencies in the case law indicate they are
largely ineffective in overcoming the vagueness of the reasonable person
test. 3 16 As one commentator states, "Although courts are essentially
attempting to answer the same inquiry, they do not always ask the same
3 17
questions and frequently differ as to the significance of various factors."
Thus, as noted above, courts differ in the weight they give to the
disclaimers, the content, the reasonable reader's knowledge of the plaintiff,
and the author's intent. 3 18 Similarly, courts disagree as to whether the
believability requirement applies to the work as a whole or its separate
3 19
elements.
Stanton and New Times further illustrate some of the specific differences.
Despite both courts purporting to follow the doctrine that the publication be
considered as a whole, they reached contradictory conclusions as to the care
exercised by the reasonable reader. 320 In Stanton, the court held that,
although the disclaimer was on the first page of the article, "some
percentage of readers who see the article, particularly casual readers who
the disclaimer." 32 1 Thus, the
only glance at it or skim it, will ignore
322
disclaimer would not preclude liability.

313. Smirlock, supra note 253, at 526.
314. Id. at 529.
315. Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd. articulated the requirement

that the

publication reasonably be read as stating an actual fact about the plaintiff. 695 F.2d 438, 440
(10th Cir. 1982). Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. held that opinion was only protected
where it did not reasonably imply a statement of fact. 497 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1990).
316. See infra notes 318-33 and accompanying text.
317. Savare, supra note 67, at 141.
318. See supra notes 98-149 and accompanying text.
319. See infra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
320. Compare Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 125 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[W]e must
examine the article in its totality in the context in which it was uttered or published and
consider all the words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence." (internal quotation
marks omitted)), with New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 154 (Tex. 2004) ("[The]
publication should be construed as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances based
upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it." (internal quotations marks
omitted)).
321. Stanton, 438 F.3d at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
322. Id.
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In addition, Stanton did not consider that the hypothetical reasonable
reader is someone who knew or knew of the plaintiff. 323 Since the plaintiff
in that case was a private figure, readers recognizing her photograph would
most likely have become especially interested in the piece and exercised
extra care in reading the article-at least more care than "casual readers
who only glance at it or skim it."' 324 Adopting similar logic, courts have
recognized that sometimes the reasonable reader may exercise extra care, or
knowledgeable about the plaintiff, and have dismissed claims
be especially
325
as a result.
In New Times, on the other hand, the court recognized that, although
"[i]ntelligent, well-read people act unreasonably from time to time,.., the
hypothetical reasonable reader ...does not." 326 Furthermore, despite ' the
327
fact that "'[p]eople every single day think The Onion stories are real,'
courts "must analyze the words at issue with detachment and dispassion,
considering them in context and as a whole." 32 8 The court could not
"impose civil liability based on the subjective interpretation of a reader who
has formed an opinion about the article's veracity after reading a sentence
or two out of context; that person is not an objectively reasonable
reader." 329 Accordingly, the court rejected the defamation claim, finding
that "a careful reader" would recognize clues in the article signaling that it
330
was satire.
The New Times court also stated that "[t]he reasonable reader would not
consider each of these clues in isolation, but would synthesize each signal
as part of the larger determination of whether [the article] can reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts." 33 1 Similarly, in Pring,the court rejected
the plaintiffs argument that even if the story was literally unbelievable, it
conveyed a "subliminal meaning of sexual permissiveness." 332 In Mitchell
v. Globe InternationalPublishing,Inc., however, the court found that "even
323. See id. at 127.
324. Id. at 126.
325. See, e.g., Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir. 2005); Wheeler v.
Dell Publ'g Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1962); supra notes 120-34 and
accompanying text.
326. New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 158 (Tex. 2004).
327. Id. at 157 n.7 (quoting Daniel Terdiman, Onion Taken Seriously, Film at 11, Wired,
Apr. 14, 2004, http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2004/04/63048).

The Onion is a

America's Finest News Source,
satirical newspaper. See generally The Onion:
http://www.theonion.com/content/index (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
328. New Times, 146 S.W.3d at 158.
329. Id. at 159.
330. Id. at 158.
331. Id. at 158-59.
332. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442-43 (10th Cir. 1982) (refusing to
consider "subliminal meaning" because it "does not represent an applicable standard").
Notably, plaintiff Kimerli Jayne Pring amended her complaint, thereby limiting "her cause to
the three [sexual] incidents ... with no general implications." Id. at 441. According to the
court, she did so to "avoid answering interrogatories." Id. As a result, "the trial court limited
defendants as to what they could question plaintiff about-no sex history." Id.; cf supra note
7.
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if the headline and certain facts contained in the article could not be
reasonably believed[,] other facts[,] e.g., the implication of sexual
'333
promiscuity, could reasonably be believed.
3. The Expanded Fault Requirement Provides Inadequate Protection
Although the expanded actual malice standard provides added protection
to authors of fiction, commentators note that it is not a cure-all. Actual
malice is "bad news for the First Amendment," according to Donald
334
Gillmor, author of Power, Publicity, and the Abuse of Libel Law.
Gillmor notes that exploring a defendant's "state of mind" for evidence of
actual malice often involves a tremendous amount of discovery and requires
"opening up the editorial process to public scrutiny. '' 335 This has led to
"[p]rolonged discovery periods [that] greatly increased the costs of libel
suits." 336

Overall, he says, defamation lawsuits have become more

"expensive, time-consuming, and incursive for defendants. 3 37
For
instance, in 2006, a case was dismissed "a full 23 years after it began. '3 38
Thus, Gillmor concludes, "If the 'actual malice' test was intended to
discourage public officials and celebrities from suing except under extreme
provocation, it failed. There are proportionately more libel suits now than
ever before, a sizable segment of them brought by public officials." 339
340
Although actual malice imposes a high burden on defamation plaintiffs,
media defendants are often not vindicated until appeal, after accruing
34 1
substantial legal costs.

Perhaps even more troubling, Gillmor says, "There is evidence to suggest
that many plaintiffs sue with no expectation of winning money damages,
but they sue anyway." 342 According to a study, half of losing plaintiffs
were "satisfied either that the media, in lieu of money damages, had been
suitably punished by a long and expensive suit or that they had managed to
deflect additional bad publicity or had gained good publicity. '343
Compared to award amounts, litigation expenses are particularly

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Mitchell v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
Donald M. Gillmor, Power, Publicity, and the Abuse of Libel Law 14 (1992).
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15; see also Seelye, supra note 311.
Gillmor, supra note 334, at 15; Seelye, supra note 311.
Seelye, supra note 311.
Gillmor, supra note 334, at 15.

340. Id. at 7. In a study, "[a]ctual malice ... was found in only nine percent of the 340
cases in which the question was addressed." Id. After appeals, only sixteen public figures
prevailed. Id.
341. Seelye, supra note 311 (quoting a media insurance company executive as saying that
"[t]he media tend to win, but it can be expensive to litigate because you aren't vindicated
until appeal").
342. Gillmor, supra note 334, at 11.
343. Id.
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significant. At one media insurance company, "60 percent to 80 percent of
' 344
the dollars ...paid out went to defense expenses, not awards.
According to Gillmor, the current process is "out of control" and benefits
neither side: "Plaintiffs ...have very little to gain, defendants much to
lose . . . ."345 In the end, he says, "Only attorneys, it would appear, benefit
from the process." 34 6 As an alternative to actual malice, Gillmor argues
that public figures should "have no remedy in libel law"-at least where the
347
media defendant provides space for alleged victims to reply.
Furthermore, it is not exactly clear how much protection even the
expanded fault standard provides against liability. The precise degree of
awareness may be different across jurisdictions. For example, according to
New Times, actual malice requires knowledge or reckless disregard "for
whether the article could reasonably be interpreted as stating actual
facts." 348 The Ninth Circuit, however, requires that the defendant "knew
(or purposefully avoided knowing) that the [publication] would mislead
[ordinary] readers." 34 9 Despite an awareness requirement, Dienes and
Levine "remain skeptical that the promise of New York Times will be fully
realized. ' 350 For example, a publisher's "'awareness' that some readers
would understand [a] .. . report to be defamatory should not be sufficient to
ground liability" where the report contains only true facts with no
endorsement and allows readers to "draw [their] own conclusion."'35'
Also, as direct evidence of the defendant's state of mind is almost never
available, actual malice is ordinarily inferred from the defendant's
conduct. 352 In fact, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had "yet to see a
defendant who admits to entertaining serious subjective doubt about the
authenticity of an article it published. ' 353 The court recognized that its
inquiry "must be guided by circumstantial evidence. By examining the
editors' actions we try to understand their motives. '354 Thus, a court could
possibly find actual malice where the defendant simply publishes a book
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Seelye, supra note 311.
Gillmor, supra note 334, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 7-8.
New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 163 (Tex. 2004).
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 317.

351. Id.

352. Eastwood v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1253, 1256 & n.20 (9th Cir. 1997);
cf Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517-18 (1991) (concluding "that a
deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of
falsity ...unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the
statement"); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512-13 (1984)
(conducting an independent review of the record and finding insufficient evidence that the
writer was aware of an error when the article was published); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S.
279, 290-92 (1971) (finding insufficient evidence of reckless disregard for the truth where
the magazine's "omission of the word 'alleged' amounted to the adoption of one of a number
of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled with ambiguities").
353. Eastwood, 123 F.3d at 1253.
354. Id.
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that is so realistic the court concludes that the defendant "had a high degree
of awareness" 355 that the book "could reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts." 356 This may not be all that different from the holding in
357
Bindrim.
In a case arising from a misleading tabloid headline, the Ninth Circuit
described the use of circumstantial evidence:
[W]e're not merely finding that the Enquirer editors "should have
foreseen" a defamatory interpretation. We are finding, based on the
evidence presented at trial, that they did foresee it. The fact that we can't
look inside the editors' minds doesn't stop us from reaching conclusions
about their thoughts; subj ective standards are nearly always satisfied by
circumstantial proof . ... 358
Due to this reliance on circumstantial proof, the actual malice inquiry often
closely resembles the initial assessment of what the publication reasonably
means, or whether the meaning is false. 3 59 When the publication itself is
the only evidence of actual malice, the court must determine whether the
publication evidences, by360clear and convincing proof, an intent to convey
the defamatory meaning.
In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., for example, actor Dustin
Hoffman complained of magazine photographs containing manipulated
images that combined celebrities' heads with models' bodies. 36 1 The
court's assessment of actual malice considered the following:
All but one of the references to the article in the magazine make it clear
that digital techniques were used to substitute current fashions for the
clothes wom in the original stills. Although nowhere does the magazine
state that models' bodies were digitally substituted for the actors' bodies,
this would be abundantly clear given that the vast majority of the featured
actors were deceased. While [Los Angeles Magazine (LAM)] never
explicitly told its readers that the living actors did not pose for the altered
photographs in the article, there is certainly no clear and convincing
355. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
356. New Times, Inc. v. Isaacs, 146 S.W.3d 144, 163 (Tex. 2004).
357. Compare Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 35-36 (Ct. App. 1979) ("Since she
attended sessions . . . certainly defendant Mitchell was in a position to know the truth or
falsity of her own material, and the jury was entitled to find that her publication was in
reckless disregard of that truth or with actual knowledge of falsity."), with Eastwood, 123
F.3d at 1256 ("[W]e find, from the totality of their choices, that the editors intended to
convey the impression-known by them to be false-that Eastwood willfully submitted to
an interview by the Enquirer. This intentional conduct satisfies the 'actual malice'
standard ... ").
358. Eastwood, 123 F.3d 1249, 1256 n.20 (quoting and distinguishing Newton v. NBC,
Inc., 930 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1990)).
359. See Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Although
Masson, Bose and Pape all concerned the evidence necessary to establish 'actual malice,'
those decisions are rooted in the question of a plaintiff's ability to provefalsity so as to show
that a defendant presented information he or she knew to be false.").
360. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
361. Id. at 1182-83, 1187-88.
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evidence in the magazine itself that LAM intended to suggest the
opposite .... 362
The court thus concluded, "We do not believe that the totality of LAM's
presentation of the article and the 'Tootsie' photograph provides clear and
convincing evidence that the editors intended to suggest falsely to the
ordinary reader that he363or she was seeing Hoffman's body in the altered
'Tootsie' photograph.Addressing defamation by implication, Thomas B. Kelley and Steven D.
Zansberg note that, despite the "emerging consensus" applying the
expanded fault test, actual malice provides insufficient protection to
defendants. 364 They conclude that, "unless it is successfully urged that the
claimed implication does not convey a provably false factual connotation,
the question of implied meaning frequently embroils the defendant in
protracted and costly discovery." 36 5 To correct the situation, they propose
that, before the "inquiry into the defendant's state of mind is undertaken,
courts should require, as a threshold matter, that the claimed inference or
implication is the principal one posited by the article, or the one that is
366
apparently endorsed by the author."
4. Protections for Opinion and Innocent Construction Offer Little or No
Protection for Fiction
As noted above, statements of opinion are not actionable unless they
367
imply the existence of undisclosed facts that are false and defamatory.
Although courts occasionally reference nonactionable opinion when
36 8
it
analyzing whether a work contains or implies a statement of fact,
appears that courts almost never hold that a work of fiction is nonactionable
opinion because it relies on disclosed facts. Thus, Smolla concluded, once
a plaintiff establishes that a fictional character refers to him, "barriers that
would normally impede recovery for a nonfiction work-tandards of
intent, or the nonactionability of opinion-.., quickly come tumbling
down."

369

According to Professor Isidore Silver, this lack of protection may be
reasonable, since "faction"-a subgenre of fiction that "adheres fairly
362. Id. at 1188.

363. Id.
364. Kelley & Zansberg, supra note 223, at 11.
365. Id. at 6.
366. Id. at 11.
367. See, e.g., Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1995); supra note
187 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989)
(parody); Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 212 (Ct.
App. 1997) (fictional movie).
369. Smolla, supra note 55, § 4:48, at 4-74; see also New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146
S.W.3d 144, 162-63 (Tex. 2004) (discussing satire and parody and concluding that "[i]t may
be difficult ... to persuade a judge that statements of fact are, under certain circumstances,
not statements of fact at all, but of opinion" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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closely to historical fact as a foundation for physiological speculation""derives its thrust from the liberal [mixture] of fact and fantasy. The reader
cannot readily distinguish between the two, and even clearly symbolic
events may be threaded with historical fact."'370 However, despite this
mixture, he says, "[L]t is error to assume that, because a work of faction
or 'realistic,' it is any less fictional
impresses one as somewhat 'historical'
37 1
than the purest fantasy or romance."
Silver contends that "[t]he invented action of a novel is nothing more
than the author's opinion of what a character would do under certain
circumstances." 372 Thus, "[s]o long as the reader is warned that the matter
is one of opinion, traditional defenses such373as 'fair comment' should be
available regardless of the particular genre."
Similarly, Smolla contends that "[t]he objective in devising a coherent
approach to handling libel claims in fiction should be to create a standard
that would give fiction the same rough quantum of constitutional and
common law protection enjoyed by nonfiction." 374 To accomplish this, he
proposes both applying the expanded actual malice requirement as well as
providing immunity "[a]s long as the ordinary reasonable reader is not led
into believing that what is packaged as fiction is meant to be taken as
fact."' 375 By incorporating intent, as determined from the work itself, this
standard would mimic the requirement that the work can be reasonably read
as intending to refer to the plaintiff, as opposed to being simply understood
as referring to the plaintiff.3 76 According to Smolla, this would not provide
excessive protection because "as long as the author does not attempt to
identify his or her fantasy as reality," there "is usually no real harm in an
life, even if those
author's drawing characters and events from real
377
characters are readily identifiable as actual people."

As Smolla retains a level of deference to the jury, however, his test
would insulate works only when the court determines that a reader could
378
not reasonably find that the work was intended to be understood as fact
But, if used as a heightened threshold test and applied directly by the court
without deference to the full range of reasonableness, this standard would

370. Isidore Silver, Libel, the "Higher Truths " of Art, and the FirstAmendment, 126 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1065, 1067 n.10, 1068 (1978).

371. Id. at 1086.
372. Id. at 1069 ("In essence, psychological character probing is an educated guess about
human motivation-an opinion. While such speculation is commonplace in the scholarly
literature of psycho-history and psycho-biography, it also exists in the novel of faction.").
373. Id.

374. Smolla, supra note 55, § 4:48, at 4-74.
375. Id. § 4:48, at 4-76.
376. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
377. Smolla, supra note 55, § 4:48, at 4-76.
378. Id. § 4:48, at 4-76 & n.l 1 (citing Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th
Cir. 1982)) ("The communication ... cannot be defamatory as a matter of law if the ordinary
reasonable reader would not treat the actions of the character as real, even if the reality of the
character is conceded.").
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mimic White's requirement (as articulated in Chapin) that the words
"affirmatively suggest that the author intends or endorses the inference. ' 379
5. Disclaimers Present Audiences with Additional Information
Some commentators have argued that courts should give greater weight
to disclaimers. 380 As discussed above, disclaimers stating that a work is
fiction are sometimes given great weight and other times essentially
ignored. 38 1 Megan Moshayedi complains that placing the burden of
proving falsity on plaintiffs immunizes defendants who pass off rumors as
facts (for example, by making a speculative docudrama) because the truth is
often unknowable and thus unprovable. 382 She notes that a disclaimer
would "preclude[] any undue reputational harm" by "informing the
audience that the speaker is not certain of what she has said. ' 383 She
further notes that since a disclaimer "does not censor the substance of the
speech," it allows the audience'384
to know "not only what a speaker has to say,
but also her level of certainty.
Glenn J. Blumstein, another commentator, has also urged courts to give
disclaimers greater weight, at least partially because they instill a degree of
doubt in readers:
The label "fiction" still proclaims that the author eschews any obligation
to descriptive truth. An ineluctable degree of doubt must therefore
accompany the reading of even the most "believable" details. "Facts"
inferred from fiction are, thereby, qualitatively
attenuated compared to
facts explicitly asserted in non-fiction. 385
Blumstein contends that without the use of disclaimers, the current
protection for fiction "offers so little guidance to lower courts that they
continue, unsurprisingly, to arrive at wildly inconsistent results.

'386

Noting that Hustler, Pring,and Dworkin all involved patently unrealistic
content, Blumstein questions whether "the 'general tenor' of a work" must
be equally unbelievable "in order to qualify for constitutional

379. Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing White v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
380. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 13, at 31; Megan Moshayedi, Comment, Defamation
by Docudrama: ProtectingReputationsfrom DerogatorySpeculation, 1993 U. Chi. Legal F.
331,341-42.
381. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. Compare Middlebrooks v. Curtis
Publ'g Co., 413 F.2d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 1969), and Smith v. Huntington Publ'g Co., 410 F.
Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1975), with Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 125-26 (1st
Cir. 2006), and Bryson v. News Am. Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1219 (Ill.
1996) ("The
fact that the author used the plaintiffs actual name makes it reasonable that third persons
would interpret the story as referring to the plaintiff, despite the fictional label.").
382. Moshayedi, supra note 380, at 335.
383. Id. at 342.
384. Id.
385. Blumstein, supra note 13, at 32.
386. Id. at 29.
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protection." 387 In other words, robbed of the disclaimer, "[w]hat elements
388
of style or content can an author rely on to negate [a] factual inference?"
So far, he notes, "The Supreme Court has failed to provide any clues as to
what more subtle literary forms it might credit. '389 As a solution,
Blumstein proposes that courts treat a disclaimer as creating a presumption
he also suggests that courts
that the work is fiction. 390 Citing39Masson,
1
should give more weight to context.
III. A THRESHOLD TEST FOR DEFAMATION IN FICTION
A. Defamatory Meaning
A heightened threshold assessment of whether a publication bears the
meaning claimed by the plaintiffs would filter out unmeritorious claims
earlier in the litigation process and avoid the lengthy and expensive actual
malice discovery process. 392 It would also bring renewed focus on the
meaning of the publication itself, which is more related to reputational harm
than the defendant's unpublished state of mind.
More troubling than the unpredictability of the reasonableness standard is
that it is applied in a manner that limits the ability of authors to control the
meanings of their statements. 393 Fiction's unique ability to look beyond
facts is dramatically hampered because courts fail to fully appreciate that
fiction purports not to state actual facts. 394 Authors would not be forced to
or extrinsic
censor their content if courts recognized sufficient contextual
395
means to shield works from liability, such as disclaimers.
Similarly, authors must be allowed to negate defamatory implications
arising from their statements without being forced to alter the statements
themselves. Society suffers when literature must bend to comply with
defamation law. 396 For example, an article stating true facts indicating that

387. Id. at 28-29.

388. Id. at 28.
389. Id. at 29.
390. Id. at 33-34.
391. Id. at 32-33; see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 512-13
(1991) ("Writers often use quotations.., and a reader will not reasonably understand the
quotations to indicate reproduction of a conversation that took place. In other instances, an
acknowledgment that the work is so-called docudrama or historical fiction, or that it
recreates conversations from memory, not from recordings, might indicate that the
quotations should not be interpreted as the actual statements of the speaker to whom they are
attributed.").
392. See supra notes 334-47 and accompanying text.
393. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990); Stanton v.
Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 125-27 (1st Cir. 2006).
394. See, e.g., supra notes 271, 371-72 and accompanying text.
395. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.5.
396. See, e.g., Stam, supra note 302, at 576 ("The first amendment seeks a 'higher truth'
than does the law of defamation; it is more realistic in theory and more practical in
application. This is the concept of truth that is advanced by authors of fiction who see their
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a person may be responsible for a crime and urging further investigation
should be carefully distinguished from an outright accusation (express or
implied) that the person in fact committed the crime-especially where the
author specifically
admonishes readers that the person's guilt is not yet
39 7
known.
A significant part of the problem is the vagueness of the reasonableness
test for determining meaning. Especially in the context of fiction or
implication, reasonableness provides insufficient guidance. People will
often differ as to when a novel reasonably states facts about a real person,
or when a statement reasonably implies a defamatory fact. As noted by
Dienes and Levine, paying renewed attention to common law doctrines of
interpretation would help, 39 8 but it is not enough.
In the context of implications, decisions such as White have recognized
the problem and begun to articulate helpful supplemental rules of
interpretation. White, as articulated in Chapin, required that "[t]he language
...not only be reasonably read to impart the false innuendo, but.., also
'399
affirmatively suggest that the author intends or endorses the inference.
As the same problems are also present in the context of fiction, 400 courts
should apply a similar rule in such cases. Thus, this Note proposes that, to
be actionable, a work of fiction must "not only be reasonably read" as
stating actual facts about the plaintiff, but must "also affirmatively suggest
4
that the author intends or endorses" the literal reading. 01
This test adopts the common law's emphasis on the author's intent, as
inferred from the publication. 402 Smolla incorporated this emphasis into his
proposal, stating that a work is not actionable unless "the ordinary
reasonable reader" believes "that what is packaged as fiction is meant to be
taken as fact." 40 3 Unlike Smolla's test, however, the proposed rule is a
threshold test that would be applied directly by the court (as in White) and
without deference to the entire range of reasonable interpretations.
To qualify for this heightened test, a work should be clearly labeled as
fiction. If the publisher uses a clear disclaimer, a literal reading of the work
is not factual-in this sense, a reader can only infer actual facts from a
publication claiming to be fiction. Just like a statement containing literally
true facts, a work of fiction is not literally false. If a publisher forgoes a
disclaimer, however, no such inference is required-the reader need only
take the author at his word to find a factual meaning.

work as a search for truth through the portrayal of lives and incidents that are factually
untrue.")
397. See Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2005).
398. See Dienes & Levine, supra note 32, at 291; supra text accompanying note 288.
399. Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing White v.

Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
400. See supra Part II.B. 1-2.
401. Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1093 (citing White, 909 F.2d at 520).
402. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
403. Smolla, supra note 55, § 4:48, at 4-76; supra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
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While a publication's realistic tone or factual references may imply that it
states actual facts, these qualities should not provide sufficient evidence of
intent to overcome a disclaimer and to be read as fact. Examples of
sufficient extrinsic affirmative suggestions may include a statement that a
film was based on a nonfiction book 404 or a press release claiming that a
film's character portrays an actual person. 40 5 By focusing this inquiry on
the context and manner in which the work is presented, as opposed to the
content itself, the unpredictable, fact-sensitive analysis required by the "of
and concerning" and statement of fact elements would be rendered largely

irrelevant.
Thus, a clear disclaimer should create a presumption that a work does not
reasonably state actual facts. Furthermore, this presumption should only be
rebuttable when something other0 6than the content itself indicates that the
4
author intends a literal meaning.
B. Actual Malice and Falsity
The proposed threshold test is also supported by consideration of the
actual malice and falsity elements. The Supreme Court, in Time, Inc. v.
Pape and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., concluded that
where reporters have interpreted ambiguous sources, actual malice may not
be inferred merely from the falsity of their reports as long as the reports
represent rational interpretations of the sources. 40 7 In Moldea v. N.Y. Times
Co., the D.C. Circuit expanded this rational interpretation doctrine. 40 8 The
allegedly libelous statements at issue appeared in a book review and "were
evaluations quintessentially of a type readers expect to find in that
genre." 40 9 Because "[r]easonable minds can and do differ as to how to

404. See Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
405. See Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 922-23 (7th Cir. 2003).
406. See Blumstein, supra note 13, at 33-34; cf Nicole Alexandra LaBarbera, Note, The
Art of Insinuation: Defamation by Implication, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 677, 700 (1990) ("A
purely contextual analysis would avoid the inconsistencies of applying the full-blown
fact/opinion test to defamatory implications.").
407. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512-13 (1984)
("[A]doption of the language chosen was one of a number of possible rational interpretations
of an event that bristled with ambiguities and descriptive challenges for the writer. The
choice of such language, though reflecting a misconception, does not place the speech
beyond the outer limits of the First Amendment's broad protective umbrella. Under the
District Court's analysis, any individual using a malapropism might be liable, simply
because an intelligent speaker would have to know that the term was inaccurate in context,
even though he did not realize his folly at the time." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971) ("[O]mission of the word 'alleged'
amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a
document that bristled with ambiguities. The deliberate choice of such an interpretation,
though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of 'malice'
under New York Times.").
408. Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
409. Id. at 315.
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interpret a literary work," the court stated, "we must allow a degree of
' 4 10
'interpretive license.'
Noting that the Supreme Court had discussed the rational interpretation
standard in the context of actual malice, Moldea nonetheless expanded its
application to falsity. 4 11 This created a broad threshold requirement
applicable regardless of whether actual malice was required. The court held
that "when a reviewer offers commentary that is tied to the work being
reviewed, and that is a supportable interpretation of the author's work, that
interpretation does not present a verifiable issue of fact that can be
actionable in defamation." 4 12 Expanding the actual malice inquiry into a
threshold requirement recognizes that the publication is often ultimately the
only evidence of actual malice. 4 13 Thus, although "the 'supportable
interpretation' rule may permit some malicious reviews to go unchecked...
'[b]ecause an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each
particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general
4 14
application.'
Similarly, expanding the Ninth Circuit's actual malice test into a falsity
test would yield a threshold test similar to the test in White. In Hoffman, the
Ninth Circuit held that, in light of the total "presentation of the article,"
there was no "clear and convincing evidence that the editors intended to
suggest" the false meaning to the reader. 4 15 With the exception of the clear
and convincing evidence requirement, this test is essentially identical to the
White test. In the context of a fiction claim, this test would require
evidence that the defendant intended to suggest a literal reading. Where the
work includes a disclaimer, it would be very hard to conclude that the
defendant intended to suggest a literal reading, especially where the focus
of the inquiry remains on the context, and not the content itself. Applying
this requirement as a threshold test would go a long way toward fixing the
problems of the expanded actual malice inquiry.
C. "Reasonable" Precautions
In addition, a more simplified version of the above proposals would
require that judges dismiss defamation in fiction claims whenever the
author has made a reasonable effort to present his work as fiction. This
approach acknowledges that some readers may "reasonably" understand the

410. Id. at 316 (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 518
(1991)).
411. Id. ("Although Masson, Bose and Pape all concerned the evidence necessary to

establish 'actual malice,' those decisions are rooted in the question of a plaintiffs ability to
prove falsity so as to show that a defendant presented information he or she knew to be
false." (citing Masson, 501 U.S. 496; Bose, 466 U.S. 485; Pape, 401 U.S. 279)).
412. Id. at 313.
413. See supra notes 352-63 and accompanying text.
414. Moldea, 22 F.3d at 320 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44
(1974)).

415. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001).
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work to state actual facts, but nonetheless recognizes that a defendant who
has exercised reasonable care has not been negligent. As Gertz requires
some degree of fault as to the truth or falsity of the publication,4 16 a
defendant who made reasonable efforts to ensure that his work will not be
read as stating actual facts has not acted with any degree of fault. After all,
4 17
a publication that is not taken as stating facts cannot be false.
Furthermore, since the fault requirement applies to both public and private
figures, this standard could be uniformly applied in both types of cases.
In the context of most tort actions alleging negligent conduct, the
plaintiff usually must show that the defendant did not exercise a reasonable
standard of care. Defamation law twists this slightly, often assuming the
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care if any defamatory meaning
remains reasonable. 4 18 Since the reasonable meaning test is particularly
unpredictable when applied to fiction, this assumption places an
extraordinary burden on publishers. Essentially, a publisher is negligent
whenever someone "reasonably" ignores a disclaimer, which may occur
whenever the content of the work is sufficiently believable. 4 19 This
proposal would simply redefine the reasonable measures publishers could
take to ensure that works of fiction are not reasonably read as stating actual
facts.
CONCLUSION

Courts have demonstrated a willingness to depart from the unelaborated
reasonable person standard and create different defamation standards for
speech made in different contexts. Reviews and critiques, for example, are
held to a standard of rational interpretation, which is below substantial
truth. Similarly, where the underlying facts are disclosed, a statement of
opinion is presumed not to be actionable. Also, in the area of implied
defamation, courts have felt compelled to impose heightened threshold tests
or categorical restrictions. These elaborations on the reasonable person
standard add invaluable clarity to an area of the law where vagueness has a
particularly potent chilling effect. Courts should not feel overly reluctant to
lay down such clear guidelines, especially since they arguably define
reasonableness more than they impose upon it.
In particular, the trend toward favoring context over content is a move in
the right direction. But this will not be enough until a mechanism is created
for allowing fiction authors to write whatever they please. A writer who
416. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 ("[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the

States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.").
417. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Old

Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-84
(1974) ("Before the test of reckless or knowing falsity can be met, there must be a false
statement of fact.").
418. See supra notes 238-42.

419. See Bryson v. News Am. Publ'ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1220-21 (I11.1996).
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claims not to speak of facts arguably has a better claim to immunity than a
speaker who opines about disclosed underlying facts. Similarly, it is quite
ironic to provide the literary critique with special deference for supportable
interpretations, and yet not provide any special deference for the literature
itself.

